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PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH  is the important  dimension of long-run  eco- 
nomic performance.  Yet economists have said relatively little about 
how policies affect the transcendently  important  long-run  growth  rate. 
Textbook  theories of the type pioneered  by Robert  M. Solow maintain 
that  policies cannot  affect growth  rates over a sufficiently  long run.  The 
growth-accounting  tradition  of Robert  M. Solowl and Edward  F. Deni- 
son2  has tended to conclude that most of the differences  in growth  are 
due  not to differences  in measured  investments,  but  to a "residual,"  total 
factor productivity  (TFP). Such models produce  what Solow calls "in- 
vestment  pessimism":  radical  policy changes  that have large  effects on 
investment  and other resource  allocations  have little effect on long-run 
growth.3 
Yet economies grow, and grow at very different  rates. The TFP "re- 
sidual"  takes on very different  values in different  economies. It is im- 
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plausible  that  these different  rates  of TFP growth  are entirely  generated 
by noneconomic  forces, unrelated  to resource allocation  decisions. If 
significant  differences  in growth  are  due to resource  allocation  decisions 
that affect total factor productivity,  private  rewards  cannot be used to 
evaluate social returns.  Thus in assessing the determinants  of growth, 
there is little alternative  to examining  natural  experiments  provided  by 
the different  policies, investment  outcomes, and growth  rates found in 
various  nations.4 
In our 1991  paper, we focused on equipment  investment as poten- 
tially a key factor in growth in a post-World War II cross section of 
economies spanning  the range from the poorest to the richest.5  Using 
data from the United Nations International  Comparison  Project  (here- 
after ICP),6 we distinguished  between "investment effort"-current 
consumption  forgone-and  actual  investment  in an economy: buildings 
constructed  and equipment  put into operation.  The real  price of equip- 
ment differs by as much as a factor of four across countries, making 
nominal  investment  shares  very imperfect  measures  of real  investment. 
We found that countries with high equipment investment grew ex- 
tremely  rapidly,  even controlling  for a number  of other  factors. This as- 
sociation suggested  a causal relationship:  rapid  growth  went with high 
equipment  investment,  no matter  whether  high  investment  was a conse- 
quence  of high  savings  or of a low relative  equipment  price. 
In this report,  we extend this line of work, focusing  on the experience 
of relatively rich high-productivity  economies that had already pro- 
gressed  far  toward  industrialization  before  our samples  began. First, we 
verify the growth-equipment  nexus using new cross-country data to 
demonstrate  that our earlier  strong  results  are the result  neither  of Dar- 
winian  biases in specification  selection nor  of placing  a heavy weight on 
the experiences  of poorer  developing  economies, which  provide  few les- 
sons for economic policy in the rich industrial  democracies. When we 
focus on the possibility that the growth-equipment  nexus varies in 
4. This  is the approach  taken  in many  recent  empirical  studies  of growth  in the "endo- 
genous growth  theory"  tradition  largely  sparked  by Romer  (1986).  See Barro  (1991)  and 
the other  papers  published  in the May 1991  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  (including  our 
1991  paper)  for a sample  of such  work. 
5. De Long  and  Summers  (1991). 
6. The ICP  data  is drawn  from  the following  sources:  Kravis  and others  (1975, 1978, 
1982);  OECD  (1987,  1992);  United  Nations  (1986);  Ward  (1985);  and  unpublished  data  pro- 
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strength  with  an economy's productivity  level, we find  little sign  that  the 
richest nations are different from other countries in this respect. 
Growth-measured by labor or by TFP-is  as tied to high equipment 
investment  for rich  countries  as for newly industrializing  ones. 
Second, we present  further  statistical  evidence suggesting  that  varia- 
tions in equipment  investment  arising  from  different  sources have simi- 
lar impacts  on growth. We support  our evidence with case studies that 
link differences in policies toward equipment  to poor performance  in 
Argentina  and impressive  performance  in Japan  over the past few dec- 
ades. Third, we calculate both social rates of return  to investment in 
equipment  and the boost to total factor productivity  growth  associated 
with equipment  investment. We find that equipment  appears  to have a 
very high net social return-in  the range  of 20 percent per year; more 
than  half of this comes from  increased  TFP. We conclude that the mac- 
roeconomic  data give no evidence that poorer  economies benefit  more 
from  high  rates  of equipment  investment  than  do richer  economies. This 
suggests, significantly,  large external benefits from equipment  invest- 
ment  even in rich  economies. We conclude  that  policies that  tilt  the play- 
ing field against  equipment  investment  are likely to be disastrous, and 
that a strong  case exists for at least modest bias in favor of equipment 
investment. 
The Robust Association of Equipment and Growth 
There  are good reasons to believe ex ante that  equipment  investment 
might  have a strong  association  with  growth.  The  link  between  technolo- 
gies and the capital  goods in which they are embodied  is a central  com- 
ponent  of economic histories.7  Steam  engines were necessary  for steam 
power, textile manufacture  required  power looms, and assembly line 
production  was unthinkable  without investments in the high-precision 
machines  that made interchangeable  metal  parts. New technologies  re- 
quire new types of capital. Technological  change is capital-using,  and 
TFP cannot  increase  without  an increase  in capital  intensity  as well.8  To 
7.  See Landes  (1969)  and  Mokyr  (1990). 
8. See Jorgenson  (1988).  Note, however, that it is very difficult  to attribute  a large 
share  of differences  in national  rates of productivity  growth  to "embodiment"  effects in 
the strict  sense. Embodiment  in the strict  sense affects productivity  only as the average 
age of the capital  stock changes,  and  the average  age of capital  is relatively  insensitive  to 
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the extent that  these factors  lead investments  in equipment  to have high 
rates of return,  they lead such investments  to have high  private returns 
and  thus generate  no strong  case for policies to tilt the playing  field. 
Yet there are reasons to believe that equipment investment and 
growth  are strongly  associated  through  channels  that  would  make  social 
returns  higher  than  private  ones. One such channel  that  is possibly more 
important  than embodiment  or the factor-using  bias of technological 
change  is the key role that is played by experience and feedback in en- 
hancing  economies' ability to produce efficiently using new technolo- 
gies. Trial-and-error  and experience are the best ways to learn what 
works, and  how what  was built  needs to be modified  to be efficient.  His- 
torians  of technology  such as David C. Mowery  and Nathan  Rosenberg 
stress that much  technological  knowledge  is "tacit":  based on hands-on 
experience, hard  to summarize,  and  difficult  to transmit  through  educa- 
tion.9  Such hands-on  experience  presupposes  investments  in the equip- 
ment  upon  which to learn. 
The importance  of trial-and-error  and experience  is magnified  by the 
process of incremental  adaptation  needed to turn  a new idea into an ef- 
ficient production  process. Experience is the best teacher not only for 
the user, but  also for the manufacturer  and  the designer  of capital  goods. 
As Rosenberg  puts it,  "most inventions  are relatively  .  .  . inefficient. 
[They are] of necessity badly adapted  to many of the ultimate  uses to 
which they will eventually  be put."  10  Mowery and Rosenberg  criticize 
those who regard  innovation  as "the  application  of 'upstream'  scientific 
knowledge  to the 'downstream'  activities  of new product  design  and . 
new manufacturing  processes.""II  In Mowery's and Rosenberg's  view, 
"the primary sources of innovation [are] 'downstream'";  improved 
equipment  and better ways of using them do not emerge without  users 
to pinpoint  useful modifications.  12 
A similar  stress on incremental  improvement  is found in Henry Ro- 
sovsky's studies of the adaptation  of well-known  technologies  to factor 
intensities and resources in industrializing  countries. Investigations  of 
Japan's  industrial  success stress Japanese  excellence in what Rosovsky 
calls "improvement  engineering."  The successful adaptation  of new 
technologies requires capabilities  to alter and modify technologies in 
9. Mowery  and  Rosenberg  (1989). 
10. Rosenberg  (1976,  p. 195). 
11. Mowery  and  Rosenberg  (1989,  p. 8). 
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many  ways and  often in response to local conditions,  Rosovsky empha- 
sizes. Furthermore,  new technologies often require  substantial  modifi- 
cation before they are successful. In Rosovsky's estimation,  this "im- 
provement engineering" also  requires a  high degree of  technical 
competence.  13 
Such "indirect"  increases in productivity can be kept proprietary 
only with difficulty.  Workers  who can use and adapt  technologies can 
and  do demand  higher  wages because their  newly acquired  skills  are val- 
uable to firms  down the street. Firms copy operating  procedures  from 
path-breaking  competitors.  Perhaps  the most important  outcome of the 
acquisition  and  use of equipment  may be what the experience  of install- 
ing and using capital teaches workers and organizations  about how to 
use modern  technologies  efficiently.  Such  a view leads to an expectation 
of high  social returns  from  equipment  investment,  because such invest- 
ment is a necessary precondition  to launch  this process of learning  and 
experience.  This view also suggests  that  good economic  policy contains 
incentives  to boost investment  in equipment. 
Previous  Results 
In our 1991  paper, we regressed  growth of output per worker  from 
1960  to 1985  (measured  in 1985  international  dollars)  on estimates  of the 
share  of output  devoted to investment  in equipment  from 1960  to 1985. 
We used estimates  of national  relative  price and quantity  structures  for 
benchmark  years denominated  in "international  dollar"  units from the 
ICP, which allows for cross-national  comparisons that are orders of 
magnitude  more  accurate  than  previous  estimates.  14 We used estimates 
of total investment  devoted to equipment  derived  from  benchmark-year 
data of Irving  B. Kravis, Alan Heston, and Robert  Summers  and other 
ICP  observations  to estimate  the share  of equipment  investment  in GDP 
from 1960  to 1985.  We then merged  our  equipment  investment  estimates 
with  the cross-country  comparative  growth  accounts  of two earlier  stud- 
ies by Summers  and Heston.  '5 
13. Rosovsky  (1972,  p. 28 ff). 
14. See Kravis  and  others  (1982). 
15. Summers  and Heston (1988, 1991).  Note that  these estimates  depend  on the ratio 
of equipment  to total investment  in benchmark  years  being  a good proxy  for the average 
ratio of equipment  to total investment, and are confined  to economies that served as 
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Our  basic regressions  controlled  for labor  force growth, investment 
in nonequipment  capital, and the productivity  gap vis-a-vis the world's 
industrial  leader. Most importantly,  our study took care to distinguish 
investment  from  "investment  effort."  Different  countries  have radically 
different  price structures.  The same forgone consumption  purchased 
three  times as much machinery  and equipment  in Japan  as in Argentina 
in the decades following  World  War  II. 
In all probability,  determinants  and  patterns  of growth  among  poorer 
economies are very different  from those of advanced  industrial  econo- 
mies. If we are concerned  with the determinants  of growth  in industrial 
economies, there is good reason to pay more attention to the high- 
productivity  countries  than  to the full sample.  But there  is a very strong 
association  between equipment  investment  and  growth  in both samples 
and  in regressions  that  include  a variety  of additional  controls.  16 Table 1 
presents results for the earlier sample of 61 non-oil-exporting  nations 
used in our 1991  paper,  and  for a subset composed of high-productivity 
nations that by  1960 had already progressed far toward industrial- 
ization.  17 
The estimated  regression  is 
(1)  Aln(Y/L) =  PO  +  BI  (Ieq/Y) +  12(Ist/Y) 
+  I3 Aln(L)  +  34(Y/L)o/(Y/L)OUs  +  e. 
The average  annual  growth  rate  in output  per worker, YIL,  for country  i 
is regressed  on several factors: a constant;  country  i's average  ratio of 
16. Moreover,  there  is no sign  that  the very  richest  economies-in  northwest  Europe, 
North America,  and Australia-are outliers  following  different  laws of motion  than the 
rest of the high-productivity  sample. 
17. The results shown here are numerically  different  from  those reported  in our 1991 
paper  because  we have corrected  two data  errors.  We thank  Nicholas  Oulton  for uncov- 
ering  these flaws in our dataset. Included  in table 1 are regressions  adding  primary  and 
secondary  school  enrollment  rates  in 1960,  as well  as continent  dummies,  to our  basic  inde- 
pendent  variables.  Of the differences  between continent  dummies,  only two are statisti- 
cally significant:  the differences  between Africa and Europe  (1.6 percentage  points per 
year,  with  a t-statistic  of 1.6);  and  the differences  between  Africa  and  Asia (1.7 percentage 
points  per year, with a t-statistic  of 2.1). School enrollment  rates are neither  statistically 
nor  substantively  significant;  a one percentage  point  increase  in the primary  school enroll- 
ment  rate is associated  with a boost in growth  of only 0.01 percentage  points per year;  a 
one percentage  point  increase  in the secondary  school enrollment  rate  is associated  with 
a boost in growth  of only 0.003 percentage  points  per year. The high  productivity  sample 
is defined  as countries  with  an  output  per  worker  level that  is at least  20  percent  of the U. S. 
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Table  1. Basic  Regression  Results  from De Long and Summers  (1991) 
High-productivity  economies 
Including  developing  economies 
Including  Including 
schooling  continent 
Independent  variable  1960-85  1960-75  1975-85  1960-85  variables  dummies 
Equipment  investment  as  0.302  0.295  0.425  0.219  0.245  0.246 
a share  of GDP  (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.105)  (0.069)  (0.073)  (0.074) 
Other  investment  as a  0.019  -0.056  0.047  0.097  0.058  0.041 
share  of GDP  (0.052)  (0.043)  (0.059)  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.042) 
Labor  force growth  0.043  -0.081  -0.177  -0.026  0.003  0.119 
(0.147)  (0.197)  (0.258)  (0.193)  (0.207)  (0.256) 
Productivity  gap  0.032  0.049  0.014  0.020  0.029  0.031 
vis-a-vis  USA  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.719  0.593  0.428  0.369  0.406  0.484 
SER  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Sample  size  25  25  25  61  61  61 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on De Long  and  Summers  (1991).  Numbers  in parentheses  are  standard  errors. 
The  dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth  rate  in output  per  worker.  See the text for  a general  specification 
of the regression  equation.  High-productivity  economies  are  defined  as having  output  per worker  levels at least one- 
fifth  the U.S. level at the beginning  or end of the sample  period. 
equipment  investment,  Ieq'Y, to GDP for country  i; its average  ratio of 
nonequipment  investment to GDP, I,,IY; its labor force growth rate, 
Aln(L);  and  the initial  relative  productivity  gap  at the start  of the sample 
period  vis-a-vis the United States, (YIL)01(YIL)us. 
On  the basis of the high-productivity  regressions,  an increase  of three 
or four  percentage  points in the share  of GDP devoted to equipment  in- 
vestment  is associated  with an increase  in GDP per worker  growth  of 1 
percent  per year. Differences  in equipment  investment  account  in a sta- 
tistical  sense for much  of the growth  performance  of fast- or slow-grow- 
ing nations. Japan  achieved a growth  rate edge of 2.2 percent per year 
from 1960  to 1985  relative  to the average  pattern.  Conversely,  Argentina 
has suffered  a growth deficit of 2.1 percent per year. More than four- 
fifths of this difference  is accounted for by high or low equipment  in- 
vestment. 
New  Sample  Periods 
THE 1950s.  The comparative  performance  of economies in the 1950s 
provides a source of information  on the strength  of the growth-equip- 
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constructed  estimates  of equipment  investment  rates in the 1950s  for 54 
economies.'8 Table  2 presents  regression  results  for the 1950s. 
Because of the short period of the sample, standard  errors  are rela- 
tively large. However, coefficient  magnitudes  are almost  the same. The 
experience  of the 1950s  is not a duplicate  of the experience  of 1960-85. 
In  the 1950s  Germany,  especially, was an extra  high-growth,  high-equip- 
ment investment country. Brazil, with moderate investment and high 
growth from 1960 to  1985, was a high-investment,  moderate-growth 
country  in the 1950s.  The 1950s  are a different  natural  experiment  than 
1960-85. 
Table 2 shows, as did table 1, that the inclusion of some additional 
growth-related  factors does not have large effects on the estimated 
equipment  coefficient. The equipment-growth  association is not due to 
the omission  of easily measured  education  proxies, or of fixed  continent- 
specific  factors. The table also shows, once again, no significant  differ- 
ences between high-productivity  economies and the sample  as a whole. 
When the sample is confined to OECD economies or when continent 
dummies  are included, the coefficient on equipment  investment falls, 
but is still  just below 20 percent. 
THE  1980s.  Only  a few years  have elapsed  since 1985,  when  our  previ- 
ous sample ended. Yet substantial year-to-year variation occurs in 
cross-country  growth  rates,  as William  Easterly  and  others  have pointed 
out.  '9 The variance  explainable  in a cross-country  regression  over five 
18. As in our 1991  paper,  we omit  high-income  oil-exporting  nations  from  our  sample. 
For  OECD  nations  and  some  others  for  which  detailed  year-by-year  measures  of the com- 
ponents  of investment  are also available,  we derived  estimates  of equipment  investment 
in  the 1950s  from  official  OECD  (or  U.N.) estimates  of the current-price  equipment  invest- 
ment  share,  adjusted  to the Summers-Heston  international  dollar  price  vector. For other 
economies,  we constructed  estimates  of equipment  investment  in  the 1950s  by multiplying 
the Summers  and Heston (1991)  estimates  of total investment  shares  in the 1950s  by our 
own estimates  of the 1960-85 equipment  share  of total investment  from  our 1991  paper. 
The non-OECD  data  are  therefore  of relatively  low quality;  they contain  no new informa- 
tion about  the division  of investment  between equipment  and structures.  However, the 
OECD  data especially  are almost  as good for the 1950s  as for the 1960-85 period:  they 
contain  substantial  amounts  of information  about  the division  of investment  between  cate- 
gories. In the regressions  in this report,  our equipment  investment  variable  includes  in- 
vestment  in  producer transportation equipment,  a  subcategory our  previous 
paper  omitted  from  the equipment  category.  We also use the log of the productivity  gap 
vis-a-vis  the United  States,  rather  than  the level of the productivity  gap,  as an  independent 
variable.  The log gap  has a much  more  natural  interpretation. 
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Table 2.  Growth Regressions for the 1950s 
High-productivity  economiesa 
Including  Including 
Basic  schooling  continent  All  OECD 
Independent variable  specifications  variablesb  dummies  economies  economies 
Equipment  investment  0.343  0.372  0.187  0.275  0.177 
(0.112)  (0.158)  (0.123)  (0.108)  (0.117) 
Other  investment  0.016  -0.005  -0.010  0.043  0.061 
(0.055)  (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.050)  (0.060) 
Log productivity gap  0.021  0.023  0.020  0.007  0.021 
vis-a-vis USAC  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Labor force growth  -0.042  0.019  0.359  -0.372  0.249 
(0.236)  (0.272)  (0.333)  (0.222)  (0.233) 
Primary school  0.021 
enrollment  (0.017) 
Secondary school  -0.010 
enrollment  (0.021) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.289  0.475  0.506  0.686  0.682 
SER  0.0159  0.0137  0.0138  0.0118  0.0097 
Sample  size  54  31  31  31  21 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  Summers  and  Heston  (1991)  and  their  unpublished  data;  ICP data;  and  OECD 
National Accounits  Statistics (various years) for estimates of equipment  investment  in the 1950s. Numbers  in 
parentheses  are standard  errors.  The dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth  rate  in output  per worker. 
a. Economies  with 1950  or 1960  output  per worker  levels at least one-fifth  that  of the United  States. 
b. Primary  and secondary  enrollment  rates  as a fraction  of the school-age  population. 
c. The log productivity  gap is used in this table  and subsequent  ones rather  than  the productivity  gap  because  the 
coefficient  on the gap in log productivity  has a much  more  straightforward  interpretation:  a coefficient  of 0.02 means 
that 2 percent  of the log productivity  gap is closed with each year, or that (0.02 x  25) = 50 percent  of the gap is 
closed over a 25-year  period. 
years is smaller  than  the share  explainable  over a longer  era. Because of 
this high short-run  variance, coefficients will be poorly estimated. 
Nevertheless, table 3 reports  regressions  for the brief 1985-90 period. 
The regression  results show that  the data  provide  poor estimates.20 
For the high-productivity  sample, the equipment  coefficient  is large: 
0.355.  However, it is imprecisely  estimated. The residual  variance of 
1985-90 growth  rates is very large, with a standard  error  of 2.9 percent 
per year. It is still worth  noting  the similarity  of point estimates. By and 
large, the relationship  between growth and equipment  that held in the 
1950s  and from 1960  to 1985  continued  to hold from 1985  to 1990.  The 
20. For OECD  nations,  the estimates  of investment  are derived  from  official  OECD 
year-to-year  estimates  of national  product,  adjusted  to the 1985  ICP data. For other na- 
tions, the share  of equipment  in investment  was set equal  to the ratio  in the 1985  bench- 
mark  year. Thus  for non-OECD  nations,  the equipment  investment  rates  for 1985  to 1990 
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Table  3. Growth  Regressions,  1985-90 
High-productivity  economies 
Including  Including 
Basic  continent  schooling  All  OECD 
Independent variable  specification  dummies  variables  economies  economies 
Equipment investment  0.355  0.088  0.331  0.217  0.114 
(0.246)  (0.262)  (0.260)  (0.184)  (0.155) 
Other investment  0.064  0.073  0.063  0.115  0.040 
(0.109)  (0.106)  (0.104)  (0.075)  (0.131) 
Log productivity gap  0.050  0.038  0.052  0.007  - 0.015 
vis-a-vis USA  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.016) 
Labor force growth  -2.221  -3.119  -2.153  -  1.176  - 0.746 
(0.529)  (0.717)  (0.557)  (0.406)  (0.697) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.377  0.510  0.382  0.248  0.216 
SER  0.0290  0.0277  0.0297  0.0290  0.0128 
Sample size  42  42  42  71  17 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Summers  and Heston  (1991) and their  unpublished  data,  and extended  using 
unpublished  post-1988  estimates  of economic  growth  from  the World  Bank. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard 
errors.  The dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth  rate  in output  per  worker.  High-productivity  economies 
have 1985  output  per worker  levels at least one-fifth  the U.S. level. 
relationships  estimated from 1960 to 1985 data do well at forecasting 
growth  from 1985  to 1990. 
THE  VERY  LONG  RUN.  Equipment investment and growth are 
closely associated not only in the post-World War  II period but in the 
longer run as well. Here we analyze a long-run  panel of seven nations 
(Argentina,  Canada,  Germany,  Italy, Japan,  the United Kingdom,  and 
the United States) over eight periods (1870-85; 1885-1900; 1900-13; 
1913-29; 1929-38; 1938-50; 1950-65; and 1965-80) of roughly 15 
years, with some dates  offset to match  business  cycles and  major  wars.2' 
Figure 1 shows the partial  scatter  of equipment  investment  and out- 
21. This  frequency  of observation  was chosen  because  we wished  to focus on long-run 
shifts  in growth  rates  produced  by shifts  in the production  potential  of economies,  and  not 
on short-run  cyclical  fluctuations  produced  by shifts  in the relative  rate  of employment  of 
resources.  The  data  and  specifications  used here  are  modified  versions  of those used  in De 
Long  (1992).  That  paper  showed  a close association  between  output  per  capita  growth  and 
a "net  concept"  of equipment  investment-the change  in  the  gross  equipment  stock-from 
1870  to 1980.  In this report,  we modify  the specification  to make it directly  comparable 
with  the gross  investment  regressions  of other  sections,  and  show  that  such  a close associ- 
ation  holds  for  the very  long-run  panel  between  output  per  worker  growth  and  gross equip- 
ment  investment. J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  167 
Figure  1. Partial  Scatter  of Equipment  Investment  and  Growth  for  the  Very  Long 
Run  Panel 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on data  underlying  De Long  (1992).  See table  4 for corresponding  regression 
results. 
put per worker  growth. Each data  point represents  the experience of a 
nation  in one period.  Table  4 reports  regressions  for this long-run  panel. 
The coefficient  on equipment  is in the same range  as in the regressions 
in table 1 and accounts  for nearly  a quarter  of the variation  in growth  of 
output per worker. Table 4 reports that introducing  educational  vari- 
ables has no effect on the equipment  coefficient.22  Era  dummies  reduce, 
and nation  dummies  raise, the coefficient  by one standard  error.23  Thus 
no nation-specific  or era-specific  effects powerful enough to generate 
the high  equipment  investment  coefficient  appear  in this panel.24 
22. The educational  enrollment  variables  have little partial  association  with growth. 
This  does not imply  that  human  capital  accumulation  is unimportant  for growth,  but only 
that  estimates  of enrollment  rates  are  bad  measures  of human  capital  accumulation. 
23. Only  one of the era dummy  variables  is significantly  different  from zero: that  for 
1929-  38. Only  two of the nation  dummy  variables-Argentina  and  Japan-are significant. 
Argentina  is low and  Japan  is high. 
24. In fact, some of the era-specific  effects go the other way. As Robert  Gordon  has 
pointed  out to us, equipment  investment  rates in the United  States and  other OECD  na- 
tions rose in real  terms  after  the beginning  of the productivity  slowdown  in the 1970s. 168  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
Table 4.  Growth Regressions for the Very Long Run Panel 
Era and 
Basic  Education  Era  Nation  nation 
Independent variable  specification  variables  controls  controls  controls 
Equipment investment  0.249  0.241  0.195  0.329  0.286 
(0.055)  (0.066)  (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.083) 
Other investment  0.009  0.012  -0.033  0.094  0.060 
(0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.053) 
Log productivity gap  0.017  0.014  0.020  0.021  0.029 
vis-a-vis USA  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
Labor force growth  0.449  0.960  0.514  0.683  0.719 
(0.426)  (0.518)  (0.426)  (0.421)  (0.511) 
Primary  school  -0.014 
enrollment  (0.009) 
Secondary school  0.004 
enrollment  (0.002) 
WWII loser  -0.038  -0.041  - 0.050  -0.035  -0.049 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.531  0.623  0.666  0.723  0.804 
SER  0.0142  0.0142  0.0132  0.0124  0.0111 
Sample size  48  41  48  48  48 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on underlying  data  from  De Long  (1992).  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard 
errors.  The dependent  variable  is the average  growth  rate in output  per worker  for a 15-year  period.  See text for 
further  specification.  The seven countries  examined  in the long-run  panel  are Argentina,  Canada,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States.  Primary  and  secondary  school  enrollment  variables  are  expressed 
as a fraction  of the school-age  population  in 1960. 
Additional  Observations 
The procedures  used in our 1991  paper  restricted  our sample  to those 
economies that  had served as ICP  benchmarks.  Here we use alternative 
procedures  for estimating  real  rates of equipment  investment  that allow 
us to construct  estimates  for economies not included  in the ICP bench- 
mark  studies. Trade  statistics  are one fruitful  source of data  on machin- 
ery investment.25  The relative  price of machinery  and equipment  is an- 
other variable that has a high correlation  with the rate of equipment 
investment,  as we showed in our 1991  paper. 
We use Brian  Aitken's estimates of the relative price of machinery 
and equipment  in the 1980s  and Jong-Wha  Lee's estimates of real im- 
ports  from  the OECD  from 1960  to 1985  to impute  equipment  investment 
25. As Warner  (1991)  has shown, the bulk  of equipment  is imported  from  abroad  in all 
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Table 5.  Equipment Investment and Growth for Additional Economies, 1960-85 
High-productivity  economies 
Including 
Including  Including  politico- 
Basic  schooling  continent  economic  All 
Independent variable  specifications  variables  dummies  variables  economies 
Equipment investment  0.220  0.181  0.096  0.233  0.336 
(0.074)  (0.102)  (0.070)  (0.084)  (0.117) 
Other investment  0.086  0.092  0.116  0.072  0.082 
(0.069)  (0.081)  (0.054)  (0.077)  (0.065) 
Log productivity gap  0.021  0.022  0.016  0.028  0.006 
vis-a-vis USA  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Labor force growth  -0.187  -0.046  0.871  -0.441  -0.122 
(0.451)  (0.594)  (0.467)  (0.550)  (0.442) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.737  0.757  0.964  0.840  0.434 
SER  0.010  0.0107  0.0059  0.0095  0.0146 
Sample size  13  13  13  13  27 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using Summers  and Heston (1991) and their unpublished  data, and ICP data. 
Estimates  of equipment  investment  have been imputed  from Aitken's  (1991)  estimates  of real relative  equipment 
prices,  and from  Lee's (1992)  calculations  of equipment  imports.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  The 
dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth  rate  in output  per  worker.  High-productivity  economies  have  output 
per worker  levels greater  than  20 percent  of the U.S. level in 1960  or 1985. 
in 27 economies not in our  previous  sample.26  Table  5 reports  results  us- 
ing only these additional  economies. 
Even though  the sample is small, the equipment  coefficient in most 
of the regressions  remains  high. However, when continent  dummies  are 
included  in the sample,  the coefficient  on equipment  falls to the level of 
26. Aitken  (1991);  Lee (1992).  In our previous  sample, these proxies  for equipment 
investment  account  for  three-quarters  of the variation  in  equipment  investment  in  our  sam- 
ple of ICP  benchmark  countries.  The best predictor  is the share  of equipment  imports  in 
GDP;  it is a direct  output  proxy, while  the other  proxy  variables  turn  out to be more  esti- 
mates  of investment  effort  than  of outcomes. 
The most extreme outlier of the economies covered by ICP benchmarks  is Brazil, 
which has a regression  residual  more  than  twice as large  as any other  country  when ICP 
estimates of equipment  investment  are regressed on imports  and relative prices. Ac- 
cording  to the underlying  data in Lee (1992, p. 96), Brazil  imported  only 0.8 percent  of 
GDP  in equipment  investment  on average  from 1960  to 1985.  Yet the ICP  benchmark  esti- 
mates of Brazil's equipment  share of investment  and Brazil's high general  investment 
share  of GDP led us to estimate,  in our 1991  paper,  that Brazil  achieved  a relatively  high 
average  rate  of equipment  investment:  4.1 percent  of GDP  from 1960  to 1985.  We believe 
that  this large  residual  is a consequence  of the import-substitution  development  strategy 
that  Brazil  chose to follow in the post-World  War  II period.  Brazil  has eschewed imports 
of machinery  and  equipment,  and  to a large  degree  has attempted  to build  its own capital 
goods-producing  industries  from  scratch.  It has achieved  a surprising  degree  of success. 170  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
Table  6. Equipment  Investment  and Growth  for the Maximal  Cross  Section,  1960-85 
High-productivity  economies 
Including  Including  Including 
Basic  schooling  continent  political  OECD  All 
Independent  variable  specification  variables  dummies  variables  economies  economies 
Equipment investment  0.225  0.192  0.175  0.182  0.151  0.327 
(0.030)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Other investment  0.077  0.077  0.060  0.076  0.039  0.062 
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.165) 
Productivity gap  0.018  0.020  0.015  0.022  0.015  0.007 
vis-A-vis USA  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Labor force growth  -0.013  0.073  -0.003  0.143  -0.361  0.070 
(0.111)  (0.122)  (0.136)  (0.128)  (0.181)  (0.166) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.759  0.778  0.842  0.811  0.834  0.425 
SER  0.0068  0.0067  0.0059  0.0064  0.0048  0.0128 
Sample size  47  47  47  47  21  88 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Summers  and Heston (1991)  and their  unpublished  data, ICP  data, and  data 
underlying  table  5. Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  The dependent  variable  is the average  annual  growth 
rate  in output  per  worker.  High-productivity  economies  have  output  per  worker  levels at least  20 percent  of the U.S. 
level in 1960  or 1985. 
the coefficient  for other  investment.  In the other  regressions,  equipment 
investment  by itself accounts for a large share of growth  rate variation 
and has a much larger  association with growth  than do other forms of 
investment.  Its estimated  coefficient  is little affected  by the political  and 
educational  variables  of Barro's  basic specification.27 
Maximal Cross-Section 
Regressions  combining  all of the sources  of data  on equipment  invest- 
ment  for the maximal  cross-section  sample  from 1960  to 1985  are shown 
in table  6 and  figure  2.28  As before, table  6 reports  regressions  of a sample 
composed  only of economies that  had 1960  or 1985  GDP  per worker  lev- 
els at least one-fifth  that  of the United States, as well as some using the 
full sample. 
27. Barro(1991). 
28. Estimates  of economic  growth  rates  are taken  from  Summers  and Heston (1991). 
Estimates  of equipment  investment  rates  are taken  from  the year-by-year  breakdowns  of 
real investment  into equipment  and other investment  at Summers-Heston  "international 
prices"  for those economies  for the  43 economies  for which  such a breakdown  exists. For 
other economies, the equipment  share  used is either  the share  imputed  from imports  of 
capital  goods  from  the  OECD,  or an  average  of the  equipment  share  estimate  imputed  from 
imports  and  the estimate  made  in our 1991  paper. J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence  H. Summers  171 
Figure  2. Partial  Scatter  of Growth  and Equipment  Investment 
for the Maximum  Extended  Cross  Section,  High-Productivity  Sample,  1960-85 
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The results  in figure  2 and table 6 are consistent with, and somewhat 
stronger  than,  those shown in table 1. For the high-productivity  sample, 
the regression  accounts  for about  three-quarters  of the variation  in out- 
put, slightly  more  than  in the corresponding  regression  in table 1. Figure 
2 shows, once again, that the very highest productivity  economies do 
not have consistently positive or negative residuals:  Italy, Japan, and 
the United States are above the fitted regression line, while Austria, 
Australia,  and  Germany  are below it. 
Sample Stratification 
For  the full  sample,  including  the poorer  developing  nations,  the max- 
imal 1960-85 cross-sectional regression accounts for not three-quar- 
ters, but only about two-fifths of the variation  in output per worker 
growth. The residual  variance  is four times larger  than the variance  of 
the high-productivity  sample. Many observations  show extreme resid- 
uals, especially sub-Saharan  African  nations  with semi-socialized  econ- 
omies such as Angola, Madagascar,  Mozambique,  Zaire, and Zambia. 172  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
In samples  that  include  the poorer  developing  economies, equipment  in- 
vestment and the other three basic variables  do not provide us with a 
comprehensive  explanation  for growth;  significant  dimensions  of varia- 
tion remain  unaccounted  for. This pattern-a  significantly  tighter  fit  and 
higher  R2  when the poorer  developing  economies are omitted  from the 
sample-suggests  a structural  break in at least the magnitude  of other 
residual  influences between the poorer and the better-off  economies. 
This  is perhaps  due to the poorer  quality  of the data  for developing  econ- 
omies, but more likely due to the existence of other important  omitted 
factors  driving  growth. 
Within  the high-productivity  sample, considerable  heterogeneity  oc- 
curs as well. The sample  includes  newly industrializing  economies such 
as Taiwan; economies such as Argentina  that have seen a prolonged 
period  of relative  decline; peripheral  European  economies such as Por- 
tugal that are rapidly  integrating  themselves into western Europe; and 
the advanced  industrial  economies of the world's  economic core. 
The implications  for U.S. or G-7 economic policy are considerably 
less interesting  if the finding  of a close association  between high equip- 
ment investment  and rapid  growth  is driven solely by the experience  of 
newly industrializing  economies. Could  it be that economies with rela- 
tively low productivity  gain substantially  from high equipment  invest- 
ment, while richer  economies that are already  near the forefront  of the 
world's  best practice  production  processes do not? 
To investigate this possibility, we stratified  the high-productivity 
1960-85 sample  by initial  output  per worker  level relative  to the United 
States. We then estimated  separate  equipment  coefficients  for the rich- 
est economies (those above the output  per  worker  cutoff  chosen) and  for 
the remaining,  middle-income  economies (those below the cutoff cho- 
sen), imposing  the restriction  that  coefficients  on other variables  be the 
same  in both  parts  of the sample.29  Table  7 reports  results  for  four  differ- 
ent stratification  levels: 60, 50, 40, and 30 percent of U.S. output per 
worker.  In no case is there a statistically  significant  difference  between 
the equipment  investment coefficients estimated  for the two stratified 
29. Allowing  other  coefficients  in addition  to the equipment  coefficient  to vary  in both 
parts  of the high-productivity  sample  generates  results that  are fragile  and inconclusive. 
There  is insufficient  identifying  variance  in the different  pieces of the sample  to generate 
precise  estimates  of all the regression  coefficients.  In a similar  fashion,  the interaction  of 
output  per  worker  and  equipment  using  the high-productivity  sample  is of unstable  sign. J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  173 
Table 7.  Equipment Investment and Growth, 1960-85:  Different Stratifications 
of the High-Productivity Sample 
Cutoff  level of output  per worker  relative  to USA 
Independent  variable  0.60  0.50  0.40  0.30 
Equipment  investment  0.230  0.212  0.223  0.229 
(countries  above cutoff)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
Equipment  investment  0.222  0.243  0.146  0.160 
(countries  below cutoff)  (0.032)  (0.038)  (0.059)  (0.062) 
Other  investment  0.077  0.079  0.079  0.075 
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Log productivity  0.018  0.016  0.020  0.020 
gap vis-a-vis USA  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Labor  force growth  -0.001  -0.019  -0.038  0.018 
(0.  109)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.  109) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.761  0.765  0.774  0.768 
SER  0.0068  0.0068  0.0067  0.0067 
Sample  size  47  47  47  47 
Source:  Authors' calculations  using the underlying data from table 6. Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors. 
The high-productivity economies,  as specified in table 6, are subdivided according to various output per worker levels 
relative to the United  States.  See  text for further discussion. 
pieces of the sample. For the cutoffs of 30 and 40 percent, there is very 
weak evidence that the growth-equipment  nexus is weaker  for middle- 
income than for the richest economies, but the associated t-statistic  is 
less than 1.5. There is no strong  reason to think  that equipment  invest- 
ment matters  much more, or less, for middle-income  newly industrial- 
izing  economies than  for high-income  industrialized  economies. 
Our  division  of investment  into equipment  and  nonequipment  invest- 
ment  components  is not the only breakdown.  It may be that  other  types 
of investment, such as research and development, and perhaps infra- 
structure,  carry high social returns. Our exploratory  regressions  have 
not turned  up evidence that  would suggest  a correlation  between  growth 
and public investment  in infrastructure  of the order of magnitude  that 
the equipment investment-growth  correlation documented above.30 
They have also failed  to turn  up evidence that, controlling  for the mix of 
equipment  and  other  capital,  business investment  has a stronger  associ- 
ation  with growth  than  does residential  construction. 
30. We have also failed to find  any cross-sectional  correlation  between  R&D invest- 
ment  and  growth,  once we control  for equipment  investment.  But we attribute  this to the 
paucity  of data  on R&D  expenditures  across  countries. 174  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
To the extent that  our  data  are able to distinguish  among  breakdowns 
of investment  into different  sets of components,  equipment  investment 
does have a uniquely  strong  association  with growth. But attempting  to 
distinguish  between different  potential  breakdowns  of investment  car- 
ries us to, or perhaps  beyond, the power of our macroeconomic  dataset 
to discriminate  among  possibilities. 
All samples  and periods we have surveyed carry  the same message. 
Regressions using new data, whether covering new periods or addi- 
tional  economies, strongly  confirm  our  previous  finding  that  the growth- 
equipment  nexus is strong.  Whether  we examine  the cross-sectional  re- 
gression  covering  the 1950s,  the results  for the 1985-90 period, the very 
long-run  panel, or the regressions  run  on additional  economies, we have 
not found  any strong  differences  in the strength  of the growth-equipment 
relationship  in samples stratified  by productivity  level.3' We have not 
found  other  breakdowns  of investment  into components  that  do equally 
well at accounting  for differences in growth  rates. If a strong growth- 
equipment  association  is not a robust  "stylized  fact,"  but  instead  a prod- 
uct of some specific peculiarity  or feature of our previous data, these 
tests of our specifications  using  new data  should  have revealed  their  fra- 
gility. They did not do so. 
How Should We Interpret the Growth-Equipment  Nexus? 
The strong association between equipment  investment and growth 
could arise if some other important  growth-causing  factor that happens 
to be correlated  with equipment  investment  were omitted  from the set 
of independent  variables.  Thus a high  equipment  investment  coefficient 
does not necessarily  imply  a strong  structural  association  of equipment 
with  growth. 
The continued strength of equipment investment when measure- 
ments of additonal  factors are added  to the right-hand  side of the equa- 
tion (as in table 6) does not eliminate  the possibility  that equipment  is a 
proxy  for one or more  of these factors. Our  measurements  are all noisy. 
31. However,  we have  found  a large  difference  in the fraction  of growth  rate  variation 
accounted  for; our  regressions  account  for a smaller  share  of variation  in samples  that  in- 
clude  poorer  economies. J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  175 
Table  8. Partial  Correlations  of Equipment  Investment  and Alternative  Factors 
Partial 
Correlated  variable  correlation 
1960  secondary  school enrollment  0.032 
1960  primary  school enrollment  0.052 
Public  investment  0.010 
Foreign  trade  share of output  0.122 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Summers  and Heston (1991)  and their  unpublished  data, ICP data, and the 
Barro-Wolf  dataset  used in Barro  (1991).  Partial  correlations  are calculated  controlling  for labor  force growth,  the 
productivity  gap, and nonequipment  investment. 
It is conceivable  that  equipment  investment  could  be more  highly  corre- 
lated  with the acquisition  of skills by the labor  force in formal  education 
than measures  of school budgets or enrollment  rates. Then equipment 
investment would be a better proxy of school-based investment in 
human  capital  than  direct measures  of schooling  themselves. In such a 
situation,  the inclusion  in the regression  of schooling  might  not signifi- 
cantly  reduce  the equipment  coefficient, even if the bulk  of the growth- 
equipment  nexus did arise from equipment's  role as a proxy for edu- 
cation. 
We think  it unlikely  that such omitted  variable  bias could be a major 
factor  because equipment  investment  has only a weak association  with 
our measurements  of other variables.  Table 8 lists some sample  partial 
correlations  of equipment  investment  with trade, education,  and public 
investment  variables.  All are small;  only one is as large  as 0.1. The varia- 
tion in equipment  investment, as a proxy for other variables,  accounts 
for  only a trivial  portion  of the variation  in these other  factors. More  than 
95 percent  of the variation  in measured  schooling  needs to be "noise"  for 
equipment  investment to be a better proxy for education. Similarly, 
more than 90 percent of the variation  in measured  trade  and openness 
needs to be "noise"  for equipment  to be a better  proxy for openness. 
It is, of course, possible that  equipment  could  be a good  proxy  for  true 
human  capital accumulation,  while nevertheless being completely un- 
correlated  with measured  schooling  in our sample. We think  that  this is 
unlikely.  However, this  possibility  remains.  Our  conclusions  are  vulner- 
able to criticism  as long as we cannot show that the growth-equipment 
nexus remains strong, even when good proxies for human  capital ac- 
cumulation,  as well as other unobservable  but powerful  growth-related 
factors, are included  in regressions. 176  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
Is the Association  Causal? 
It is conceivable that a strong association between investment and 
growth represents  reverse causation running  from fast growth to high 
investment.  It is less plausible  that such reverse  causation  would  induce 
a strong  partial  association  between growth  and equipment  investment 
without  inducing  a strong  partial  association  between growth  and struc- 
tures investment.  Accelerator  effects work on structures  as powerfully 
as they work on equipment.  In addition,  our 1991  paper  found that the 
strong  correlation  between  growth  and  equipment  investment  was a cor- 
relation  between intensive  growth  (growth  in productivity  holding  popu- 
lation  constant)  and equipment.  Extensive growth  (increases  in popula- 
tion, holding  productivity  constant)  did not have a differentially  strong 
association  with investment  in equipment,  as opposed to investment  in 
structures. 
P R  I C  E S A N D Q  U A N T I T I E S.  We believe that the most powerful  piece 
of evidence for attributing  causal significance  to the equipment-growth 
nexus is the negative  association  between equipment  prices on the one 
hand  and  equipment  investment  and  growth  on the other. If high  rates  of 
investment were a consequence, rather  than a cause of growth, one 
would  expect equipment  prices  to be higher  in rapidly  growing  countries 
because of strong  demand  pressing  on the limits  of supply. 
This argument  is simple supply-and-demand.  Fast growth  could in- 
crease equipment  investment  by raising  profits  and shifting  the derived 
demand  for equipment  to the right. This would move the economy up- 
ward  and outward  along the supply  curve. In such a case, rapid  growth 
would go together  with high  equipment  investment  and high  equipment 
prices.32 
Figure 3 shows the association of equipment  prices, quantities,  and 
output  per worker  growth  rates  for 31 countries  in our  high-productivity 
sample.  The vertical  axis plots the relative  price  of machinery  and  equip- 
ment in 1980,  as estimated  by Aitken, controlling  for current  output  per 
worker levels.33  The horizontal axis plots our estimates of  1960-85 
equipment  investment  shares  of GDP, once again  controlling  for output 
32. If supply  curves sloped downward  because of economies of scale, then high  de- 
mand  could lead to low prices. However, few nations  produce  their  own machinery  and 
equipment.  Machinery  and  equipment  are  for the most part  purchased  on a world  market. 
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Figure 3.  Identification from the Correlation of Growth and Investment Prices 
and Quantities 
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per worker  levels. The individual  country  points plotted contain infor- 
mation  about  the country's  GDP per worker  growth  rate relative  to the 
average, again controlling  for output  per worker  levels. The countries 
are sorted  according  to whether  their  relative  annual  growth  rate is less 
than -  1.0 percent;  greater  than -  1.0 percent, but negative; positive, 
but less than 1.0 percent;  or greater  than 1.0 percent. 
Of the seven economies with growth  rates in the slowest group  (con- 
trolling  for initial  GDP per worker  levels), five are in the upper  left cor- 
ner of figure  3, with higher-than-average  relative equipment  prices and 
lower-than-average  equipment  investment  rates. All three  of the fastest 
growing  economies are in the lower right quadrant,  with higher-than- 
average equipment  investment rates and lower-than-average  relative 
equipment  prices. We believe that high equipment  investment  is more 
the result  of favorable  supply  than  of high  demand  induced  by rapid  ex- 
ogenous  growth. 
INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES.  Further  evidence that  the strong  asso- 
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structural  association comes from instrumental  variables  estimates of 
the strength  of the growth-equipment  nexus. Any claim  that  the relation- 
ship running  from equipment  to growth  is causal  is a claim that a given 
shift in equipment  investment-however  engineered-will  be associ- 
ated  with a constant  shift  in growth.  The next best thing  to direct  experi- 
mental evidence is to examine whether components of equipment  in- 
vestment driven  by different  factors have the same impact  on growth. 
We examined  the relationship  between growth  and  various  components 
of equipment  investment associated with different  aspects of national 
economic  policies.34 
Table  9 reports  regressions  of growth  on components  of the variation 
in equipment  investment.  The coefficients  measure  the association be- 
tween growth  and  that  portion  of equipment  investment  correlated  with 
the instrument.  We use three sets of instruments:  the average savings 
share  of GDP from 1960  to 1985;  our own estimates of the deviation  of 
the real price of equipment  from its expected value; and tariff  and non- 
tariff  barriers  to equipment. 
No matter  which of these dimensions  we examine, the association  of 
equipment  and growth  remains  the same. Estimated  coefficients range 
from 0.232 to 0.275. The similarity  of the association with growth  for 
each of these components of equipment  strengthens  the case that the 
equipment-growth  nexus is a "structural"  relationship,  not generated 
because equipment  is a signal that other growth-producing  factors are 
favorable. 
Despite the similarity  of the estimated  equipment  coefficients,  the in- 
struments  do capture  different  aspects of the variation  in equipment  in- 
vestment. The correlations  among  the second-stage  equipment  invest- 
ment values for the different  instrumental  variables  regressions  are not 
high. Controlling  for nonequipment  investment, the productivity  gap, 
and  labor  force growth,  there  is a partial  correlation  of 0.43 between the 
saving-based  and  price-based  second-stage  equipment  variables;  of 0.45 
between the price variable  and the trade-barrier  variables;  and of only 
0.28 between the saving  and  trade-barrier  variables. 
CASE  STUDIES:  ARGENTINA  AND  JAPAN.  One additional  line of evi- 
dence that  the association  between  equipment  investment  and  economic 
34. We examined  the coefficient  produced  by different  two-stage  least squares  regres- 
sions of growth  on equipment  investment  with different  sets of instruments.  This proce- 
dure  can  be viewed  as an  informal  Hausman-Wu  test of the proposition  that  the equipment- 
growth  relationship  is a structural  one uncomplicated  by omitted  variables  or simultaneity. ro) 
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Figure  4. GDP per Capita  Growth  in Argentina  and Europe  after World  War II 
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Source:  De Long and Eichengreen  (1991, p. 39) based on Summers-Heston  estimates. 
growth  is causal, and  that  high  equipment  investment  is more  than  a sig- 
nal that fundamentals  are attractive,  comes from analyzing  exemplary 
case  studies. Here we briefly consider the disappointing  economic 
growth  of Argentina  and the extraordinary  growth  of Japan's  economy 
since World  War  II. 
Up to the late 1950s,  Argentina  was, and  for half a century  had been, 
a country about as rich as the nations of continental  Europe. In 1929, 
Argentina  ranked  about  fourth  in the world  in automobiles  per capita.  In 
1913, Buenos Aires was thirteenth  among the world's cities in tele- 
phones per capita. Yet by the late 1970s-even  before the borrowing 
spree of the 1970s  and the recession of 1980-82 led to the Latin  Ameri- 
can debt crisis, and the subsequent  decade of decline-Argentina had 
become a third  world country, rather  than a first world one. Figure 4 
shows the relative erosion of Argentine  productivity  and living stan- 
dards  according  to the Summers-Heston  estimates. 
In the aftermath  of the Great Depression and World War II, Juan 
Peron  gained  mass political  support  by advocating  a political  program  of 
national  reassertion  and  populist  redistribution.  Agricultural  marketing 
boards were established to limit the price of food and to keep rural 
monopolies  from  gouging  urban  workers.  The growth  of unions and the J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  181 
organization  of workers were supported to allow the urban working 
classes a fair chance to bargain  against  their employers. Urban wages 
were boosted. 
Peron's  policies were popular.  As Carlos  F. Diaz Alejandro  writes: 
[F]avoring  domestic consumption  over exports pleased the urban  masses, and 
strengthening  import  restrictions  pleased urban  entrepreneurs.  All who would 
lose, it appeared,  were foreigners  who had to do without  Argentine  wheat and 
beef and could not sell manufactures  to Argentina,  and the oligarchs  who had 
previously  profited  from  the export-import  trade  and  their  association  with for- 
eign  investors.35 
Peron's policies twisted the terms of trade against  rural  agricultural 
goods and  in  favor  of urban  industrial  goods. Real  wages  for  urban  work- 
ers and  profits  for urban  manufacturers  rose, while real  incomes of rural 
workers  and landlords  fell. Imports  climbed and exports dropped. By 
the late 1940s, the resulting  foreign exchange shortage  left Peron with 
only unattractive  options. Currency controls were used to allocate 
newly scarce foreign exchange. The raw materials and intermediate 
goods needed to maintain  current  operations  had  first  priority,  and  kept 
flowing. But machinery  and equipment,  last in the queue, could not be 
imported  in large  quantities. 
The early 1950s  saw a huge rise in the relative  price of capital  goods. 
Before 1948,  Argentina's  relative price structure  had been comparable 
to that of Australia  or New Zealand.  According  to the Economic Com- 
mission  for Latin  America,  producer  durables  prices increased  relative 
to the output  deflator  by more than 150  percent  between 1948  and 1953. 
Each  percentage  point  of national  product  saved  produced  less than  half 
as much in terms of real investment  in producer  durables.  A sharp  de- 
crease in the rate of real capital  formation  in new machinery  and equip- 
ment  followed. According  to Diaz Alejandro,  the share  of real producer 
durables  investment  in the 1950s  was less than  half  what  it had  been even 
in the depressed 1930s.36 
Successor governments  did not reverse Peronist  policies: the forces 
he had mobilized  had to be appeased.  Argentine  governments  through- 
out the post-World  War  II era remained  committed  to relative  autarky, 
favoring  urban  over rural  producers,  terms  of trade  that  placed  rural  pro- 
ducers at a disadvantage,  overvalued  exchange rates, and import  con- 
35. Dfaz  Alejandro  (1970,  pp. 108-09). 
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trols. This produced  an extraordinary  rise in the relative real price of 
machinery  and equipment-and a consequent  fall in the rate of invest- 
ment  in machinery  and  equipment.  In Diaz Alejandro's  view, this fall in 
investment was the principal source of slow Argentine growth after 
World  War  II. Argentina  had a low TFP "residual"  growth  rate  because 
it had a low rate  of equipment  investment: 
A good part of the residual  arises from not fully taking into account quality 
changes in machinery  and equipment  . ..  Even when technological  improve- 
ments  are not embodied  in capital  . ..  taking  full advantage  . ..  often requires 
the purchase  of new machinery  and equipment,  while access to these capital 
goods will stimulate  technical  education  and  the use of better  practices.37 
By contrast, the economic boom in Japan since World War II has 
been the most extraordinary  positive episode in the postwar period. 
Given the frequent emphasis on the strong structural  differences be- 
tween Japan  and  the other  industrial  market  economies, it is noteworthy 
that Japan does not have a high positive residual in our regressions: 
Japan's  growth  is about  where predicted  given its initial  level of output 
per worker,  its rate of investment  in machinery  and equipment,  and  the 
cross-sectional  pattern  that holds for other countries. Our  regressions 
attribute  more  than  80  percent  of the 4.5 percentage  point  per  year  differ- 
ence between Argentine  and  Japanese  growth  rates  from 1960  to 1985- 
a difference  in growth  that  has led Japanese  output  per worker  to quad- 
ruple relative to Argentina's  in a single generation-to  differences in 
rates of equipment  investment. In our regressions, differences  in rela- 
tive starting  points  and  in rates  of equipment  investment  account  for the 
entire  difference  between  Japanese  and  U.S. growth  rates.  Thus  Japan's 
rapid  growth  is attributable  to its extraordinarily  favorable  factor  supply 
fundamentals:  its low producer  goods prices  and  high  equipment  invest- 
ment quantities.  Growth  has been further  boosted by favorable  demo- 
graphics,  a well-educated  population,  and  its low post-World  War  II ini- 
tial starting point. Little is  left to be  attributed to any qualitative 
difference  in economic structures. 
Japan's  high  rate  of equipment  investment  has many  sources. A high 
saving  rate is one. An openness to imports  of technology  and of foreign 
capital  goods is another. A third, less noticed factor has been the low 
relative  price of machinery  and equipment  in Japan.  A large  equipment 
investment effort-the  share of national product saved and spent on 
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Figure  5. Machinery  and Equipment  Prices  and Output  per Worker,  1980 
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equipment-has been transformed  into an extraordinarily  large  quantity 
of machinery  and equipment  investment  by low relative prices of pro- 
ducer  durables. 
Figure  5 plots the log of the price  of machinery  and  equipment  relative 
to the price  of GDP  against  real  GDP  per worker  levels in 1980,  from  the 
1980  U.N. ICP benchmark.  In 1980,  Japan  had a relative price of ma- 
chinery and equipment  20 percent below what would have been ex- 
pected given its level of output  per worker. Such a relative  price struc- 
ture increases the rate of investment in machinery and equipment 
through  two channels. First, the same quantity  of consumption  goods 
forgone  purchases  a greater  quantity  of investment  goods. Second, the 
more  favorable  terms  of trade  at which current  consumption  can be ex- 
changed  for income-producing  physical assets may induce a high level 
of saving. 
What  is the source  of this price  structure  that  appears  so favorable  for 
equipment  investment,  and thus for economic growth?  It is tempting  to 
attribute  it to the policies and practices of Japan's  Liberal  Democratic 
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regulation by LDP-client bureaucracies  interested in advancing the 
wealth  of producer  interests.  However, the prices  of producer  goods are 
not elevated: they are not the domain  of the patron-and-client-oriented 
LDP. Thus  we would  ascribe  a potentially  important  role to the Ministry 
of International  Trade  and Industry  (MITI),  as a bureaucracy  oriented 
not toward  enriching  the interests  of producers  of capital  goods, but in- 
stead focused on achieving value for the purchasers  of capital goods 
whose productivity  is to be enhanced  through  investment.38  We suspect 
that the Japanese  government,  including  MITI, has played a significant 
role in Japan's  rapid  growth.  But we suspect that MITI  has done so not 
by micromanaging  industrial  development,  but by blocking  the effects 
of politics-as-usual  in the investment  goods markets.  The  rest of the reg- 
ulatory  bureaucracy  has aided development  because (unintentionally) 
its attempts  to enrich  producer  interests  have helped create a structure 
of prices and incentives in which houses are expensive, rice is costly, 
but equipment  is cheap. 
From  our  perspective,  one of the reasons  for the success of the Japa- 
nese economy has been that monopolistic  high prices in other sectors, 
partially  created  by government  action, have led to Japan's  "getting  rel- 
ative prices right." High absolute levels of other prices have pushed 
down the relative  price  of equipment,  making  it more  "right"  than  would 
complete  laissez-faire-in  the sense of bringing  private  incentives  to in- 
vest in equipment  more  closely in line with social returns. 
Equipment Investment and Total Factor Productivity Growth 
The correlation of equipment investment and output per worker 
growth implies an equally strong and almost as large a correlation  be- 
tween equipment  investment and TFP growth. The reason is straight- 
forward, springing from the  "investment pessimism" of  standard 
38. Okimoto  (1989,  p. 5) stresses that  in "most  cases, such pockets  of inefficiency  lie 
outside  MITI's  jurisdiction."  According  to his analysis,  LDP  members  seeking  to transfer 
wealth  to sectors  and  ministers  find  it easier  to do so if the sector  is outside  the purview  of 
the MITI  ministry,  with its strong  interest  in efficiency  and  development.  Thus  the MITI 
bureaucracy  fulfills  a valuable  social role, even though  the industrial  policies it pursues 
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models. Because even drastic assumptions  about factor shares do not 
lead  shifts  in investment  rates  to have large  effects on growth  rates, large 
differences  in growth  rates  cannot  be driven  by shifts  in investment  rates 
uncorrelated  with TFP growth. 
To make  this analysis  more  formal,  suppose that  total  factor  produc- 
tivity is uncorrelated  with and independent  of investment. Begin with 
the identity 
(2)  AY, =  (r +  8)AK, 
where Y  is output, r is the social net rate of return,  8 is the depreciation 
rate, and K is capital  stock. Equation  2 simply  states that  the (gross)  in- 
crease in output produced  from an increase in the capital stock is the 
gross rate  of return  on capital  times the increase. Suppose  that  an econ- 
omy initially  in steady state receives a permanent  boost, I, to its gross 
investment  and  that  its capital  stock evolves following 
(3)  AKt =  I -  8Kt-1. 
Equation  3 simply  states that  the increase  in the capital  stock is equal  to 
new (gross)  investment  minus  depreciation  on last period's  capital. 
In the first  period, the entire boost to investment  will show up as an 
increase in the capital stock: AK, = I, and A  Y, =  (r +  8)I. In the second 
period, investment  will still be running  at its higher  pace, boosted by I, 
but because K1 is higher  than  Ko,  depreciation  will be higher  than  it was 
in steady state. The increase in the capital stock will be less: AK2  = 
(1 -  8)I, and A  Y2 =  (r +  8)(1  -  8)I. The successive  increases  in the 
capital  stock will become smaller  and smaller,  and the sum of changes 
in the capital  stock will converge  to a steady-state  value, AK*: 
(4)  AK* =  I/8. 
Thus even if we assume that r does not fall as K increases, the boost to 
the steady-state output level, A  Y*, that can result from a permanent 
boost to investment  is 
(5)  AY* =  I (r +  8)18. 
An increase  in investment  equal to one percentage  point of output  can 
thus induce  no more  than  a (r + 8)/8  percentage  point boost in the level 186  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
Table  10. The Growth-Equipment  Nexus  in a Neoclassical  Growth  Model 
Annual  output growth  Net social  by time horizon  a 
rate of  Depreciation 
return  rate  15 yrs.  25 yrs.  40 yrs. 
0.05  0.15  0.09  0.05  0.03 
0.10  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.04 
0.15  0.15  0.14  0.08  0.05 
0.30  0.15  0.20  0.12  0.07 
0.45  0.15  0.26  0.16  0.10 
Source:  Based on authors' calculations. 
a.  The last three columns  show  the boost  to the growth rate of output,  in percentage  points,  resulting from a  1.0 
percent  rise in investment.  See  text for a further description. 
of output-and thus no more  than  a (r + 8)I(8T) boost to the growth  rate 
of output  over a T-year  period.  Table 10  shows, for different  values of r, 
8, and T, the boost to growth  rates resulting  from  a unit  boost to equip- 
ment  investment.  Even an extraordinarily  high  private  net rate  of return 
to equipment  investment  of 30 percent  per year or more  does not gener- 
ate as strong  an association  between equipment  investment  and  growth 
as we find  in our cross-country  data. 
Because equipment  capital depreciates so rapidly  and 8 is so high, 
even astronomical  private  rates of return  on equipment  cannot  account 
for any substantial  correlation  of growth  and investment  rates; the low 
durability  of equipment  capital prevents an increment to investment 
from  raising  the rate  of growth  of capital  for long. In neoclassical  growth 
models, a great  deal hinges on the relative durability  of investments  in 
different  kinds  of assets. Investments  that  are not durable  can, as a mat- 
ter  of accounting,  have only small  effects on long-run  growth  rates. Thus 
we would anticipate,  according  to this line of reasoning,  that it would 
be gross investment  in structures and not investment  in equipment  that 
would  have the largest  long-run  effect on growth  rates of GDP. 
If we are  going  to account  for a strong  association  between  equipment 
investment  and output  growth,  we must do so in a context in which the 
benefits  from investing  in equipment  do not depreciate  rapidly.  Equip- 
ment investment  can plausibly  have a large effect on long-run  growth 
rates  only if it yields benefits  that  do not depreciate  as fast as equipment 
does; that is, that outlive the investments  themselves. The assumption 
that investments  in equipment  spur productivity  growth  ascribes such 
long-lasting  benefits  to them. If we can show that  TFP  depends  on equip- J. Bradford  De Long and Lawrence  H. Summers  187 
ment investment, then we can account for the strong association be- 
tween long-run  growth  rates and  equipment  investment.39 
Estimating  Total Factor  Productivity 
Neoclassical growth theory can be viewed as either an organizing 
framework  for thinking  about  growth  or as a substantive  theory. To the 
extent that it is a substantive  theory, one of its most basic predictions 
must be that TFP growth is not associated with the principal  dynamic 
variables-investment,  depreciation, and population growth rates- 
about  which neoclassical  growth  theory makes  predictions.  In this sub- 
section, we test and  reject  the null  hypothesis  that  TFP growth  is uncor- 
related  with equipment  investment. 
It should  come as no surprise  that  the very strong  association  of out- 
put  per  worker  growth  and  equipment  investment  documented  above is, 
in large part, also a strong association between equipment  investment 
and total factor productivity  growth. Given the limitations  of our data- 
base, the calculation  of total  factor  productivity  estimates  is not straight- 
forward.  We require  estimates of the average share accruing  to factors 
of production,  and estimates not of gross, but of net investment  rates. 
Thus  total  factor  productivity  estimates  require  estimates  of initial  capi- 
tal stocks. Because such initial  capital stock estimates are crude, they 
introduce  a potential  source of noise into TFP growth  calculations. 
We have estimated  1960-85 TFP  growth  rates  for 31  of the economies 
in our  high-productivity  sample. For these 31 economies, we have year- 
by-year  estimates  of nominal  investment  in different  types of assets and 
of price structures  in the 1950s. Along with an assumption  about pre- 
1950  investment,  we can construct 1960  estimates  of capital  stocks that 
can then  be used to calculate  total  factor  productivity  growth  from 1960 
to 1985.  The restriction  of our  total  factor  productivity  growth  estimates 
to 31 high-productivity  economies limits us to a sample that does not 
show the growth-equipment  nexus as strongly  as some of our  other  sam- 
ples. For equations  such as those in table 1, the equipment  investment 
coefficient  over the 1960-85 period is 0.198 for this particular  sample, 
toward  the low end of the range  found  in our later  regressions. 
39. One model  in which  TFP is a function  of investment  is the "creative  destruction" 
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We assume that countries  not severely damaged  by World  War  II or 
the Korean  War  had achieved steady-state  capital  output  ratios  corres- 
ponding  to their 1950s  investment  rates  by 1960.  For countries  that  were 
sites of World  War  II battles, we assume that 1950  capital  stocks were 
two-thirds  of steady-state  values. In estimating  capital-output  ratios,  we 
assume depreciation  rates of 15 percent per year for equipment  and 2 
percent  per year  for structures. 
We also assume that the labor  force in efficiency units is augmented 
by education. We set the effective labor force to  the labor force 
multiplied  by (1 +  g)S, where g is a return  on schooling, and S is the 
average schooling of the population,  taken from Barro  and Lee.40  We 
take the production  function  to be Cobb-Douglas  in effective labor and 
in a single capital  services aggregate.  We weight  equipment  more heav- 
ily than  structures  in constructing  our  capital  services aggregate  because 
equipment's  higher  depreciation  rate requires  it to contribute  a larger 
service flow to productivity  in order  to yield the same net rate of return 
as structures  capital. 
Total Factor  Productivity Regressions 
Table 11  shows results  from  our  regressions  of total  factor  productiv- 
ity growth  from 1960  to 1985  on our basic variables,  and on the change 
in schooling according  to Barro and Lee.41 The first column gives the 
share  of capital  in the production  function;  the second column  gives the 
implied  average  net rate of return  on investment  in the sample  in 1985. 
In our sample,  the average  capital/output  ratio  in 1985  is approximately 
1.6, and  one-third  of the capital  stock is equipment.  A unit  of equipment 
contributes  nearly  twice as much  current  capital  services as does a unit 
of structures.  Thus in our model, the gross return  on structures  is one- 
third  lower  than  the capital  share  divided  by the capital/output  ratio.  The 
third column shows g, the assumed rate of return  on investments in 
schooling. 
Figure  6 shows the difference  between the estimates of total factor 
productivity  growth and output per worker  growth  from 1960  to 1985, 
assuming  a capital share of 0.3 and a zero rate of return  to education. 
TFP growth  and output  per worker  growth  are correlated,  but far from 
40. Barro  and  Lee (1992). 
41. BarroandLee(1992). ,I-  I 
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Figure 6.  Scatter of Total Factor Productivity Growth and Output per Worker 
Growth, 1960-85 
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(1991); and Lee  (1992). Dashed  line plots total factor productivity  growth and output per worker growth from  1960 
to 1985  when  they are equal. 
collinear. The most extreme divergences between output per worker 
and total factor productivity  growth occur in the cases of Korea and 
Norway.42  The rest appear  grouped  together  in figure  6 near a line with 
a slope less than  one. On  average,  those economies that  have the largest 
gaps between TFP growth  and output  per worker  growth  (and thus the 
fastest rates  of capital  deepening)  are  also those economies  that  have the 
fastest TFP growth. 
The remaining  columns  of table 11  present  the results of regressions 
using  the implied  estimates  of total  factor  productivity  on equipment  in- 
vestment  and  other  variables.  The factor  shares  assumed  in the first  four 
rows of table 11  are closest to our prior  beliefs about  private  rates  of re- 
42. Destruction  from  the Korean  War,  coupled  with  economic  stagnation  and  low in- 
vestment  in the 1950s,  gave Korea  very  low capital-output  ratios  in 1960.  Much  of its rapid 
subsequent  growth  can be traced  to making  up the gap  and  realizing  the very high  private 
returns  that  standard  models  predict  should  be present  after  such  a decade  of war-related 
destruction  and  low investment.  Norway  experienced  a significant  boost in capital  toward 
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turn.43  The second row allows for net  private returns  to investment in 
physical  capital  and in schooling  in the range  of 10  or more percent  per 
year and allows for a gross return  to equipment  investment  of nearly  30 
percent  per year. 
Even with such  high  assumed  private  gross returns,  a significant  asso- 
ciation remains  between equipment  investment  and growth. In the first 
and  second rows of table 1  1, the share  of income  paid  for capital  services 
is 30 percent, corresponding  to a net return  to investment  of 13  percent 
per year, and to gross returns to investment in rapidly depreciating 
equipment  and slowly depreciating  structures  of 28 percent  and 15  per- 
cent per year, respectively."4  Under these assumptions,  each percent- 
age point of machinery  and equipment  investment  is associated with a 
boost in TFP of 0.11 percentage  points. 
With  a smaller  capital  share,  the equipment  investment-TFP  associa- 
tion  is stronger.  The third  and  fourth  rows of table 11  display  results  with 
a capital  share  of 20 percent, corresponding  to a net return  of 8 percent 
and  gross returns  to equipment  and  structures  of 23  and 10  percent.  Each 
percentage  point of equipment  investment  is associated with a boost in 
estimated  TFP of 0.15 percentage  points. With  a larger  capital  share, as 
in the fifth and sixth rows, the equipment-TFP  association is weaker; 
with a capital  share of 40 percent, each percentage  point of equipment 
investment  is associated  with  a TFP  boost of only 0.08 percentage  point. 
These regressions  also reveal a weaker  correlation  between non-equip- 
ment investment  and  growth. 
For the very highest capital share we consider-50  percent, corre- 
sponding  to net  private  rates  of return  on investments  in equipment  and 
structures  of more than 20 percent per year-the  association between 
TFP growth and equipment  investment  ceases to be stronger  than the 
association  between  TFP  growth  and structures  investment.  Those who 
believe that typical investments  yielded such high net rates of return  in 
the range  of 25 percent per year could reject our claim that equipment 
43. Julio  Rotemberg  has observed  that these estimated  capital  shares,  while reason- 
able  for  OECD  nations,  are  low for  NIC  economies.  We  experimented  with  making  capital 
shares  a function  of productivity  levels, allowing  for  higher  capital  shares  in poorer  econo- 
mies;  we found  no significant  difference  in our  results. 
44. Recall  that the flow of capital  services from  a unit  of equipment  is assumed  to be 
greater  than  the flow  from  a unit  of structures  by  just enough  to offset the depreciation  on 
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investment is disproportionately  associated with rapid TFP growth. 
However, they could not return  to the neoclassical growth model as- 
sumptions  that  TFP is largely  independent  of rates  of investment.  In the 
last row of table 11, both equipment  and structures  investment  rates are 
significantly  associated  with TFP growth. 
There is no sign of any strong  association between TFP growth and 
schooling.  Changes  in measured  schooling  do not have any strong  influ- 
ence on the magnitude  of other coefficients, and do not have a high 
enough  partial  association  with  output  or TFP  growth  to suggest  a social 
rate of return  of more than 10  percent. This may well arise because our 
estimates of schooling  are poor estimates of true investment  in human 
capital. We interpret  the (at times) negative associations of estimated 
TFP growth  and schooling  as carrying  information  about  the inadequate 
nature  of our proxies for educational  investment, not as indicating  that 
schooling is a relatively  unproductive  investment from a social stand- 
point. 
The Social  Rate  of Return to Equipment Investment 
In those TFP growth  regressions  that assume private  net rates of re- 
turn  on investments  in the range  that  we find  reasonable,  a 1 percentage 
point increase in the equipment  investment  share  of GDP is associated 
with an increase of approximately  0.10 to 0.15 percentage  points per 
year in the TFP growth  rate. Suppose  that  equipment  investment  yields 
a net private  rate  of return  of 10  percent  that  roughly  corresponds  to the 
return  on business  investments,  and  an associated  gross rate  of return  of 
25 percent  per year. What  then is the social rate of return  to equipment 
investment? 
The exact calculation  of the social rate  of return  hinges  on the timing 
of the external rise in TFP that may be induced by equipment  invest- 
ment. If this extra  rise happens  immediately-at the moment  of installa- 
tion, as new equipment  is brought  on line and  workers  and  organizations 
learn  the skills necessary to use it efficiently-then the net social rate  of 
return  to equipment  investment is 25 percent per year or so: approxi- 
mately 10  percent  in extra  privately  appropriable  value created  through 
capital deepening, and approximately  15 percent through  the external 
effects induced.  Models such as that  of Aghion  and  Howitt, in which  pri- 
vate investment  in new types of equipment  raises  productivity  at the mo- J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  193 
ment of  such investment, suggest such a front-loading  of the TFP 
boost.45 
If this extra rise is spread  out over time proportional  to the depreci- 
ated remaining  value of the extra  capital  put in place, then the net social 
rate of return  is lower because the productivity  gains occur only in the 
future and must be discounted. In a model in which the external TFP 
benefits  from equipment  investment  accrue because of learning-by-do- 
ing-by  which, through  experience, organizations  and workers  acquire 
the skills needed to handle  modern  technologies productively-such  a 
time  pattern  would  be suggested.  At the 15  percent  per  year  depreciation 
rate assumed  for the benchmark  parameters,  the social rate of return  is 
about  20 percent  per year. Pushing  off the external  productivity  benefits 
of investment  to future years by making  them proportional  to current 
capital  services substantially  reduces the present value of the external 
productivity  gains  that  are  induced.  If the external  productivity  gains  are 
all delayed until  the tenth year after  the initial  investment-an  extreme 
assumption  useful  only as a bound,  because by that  time  the depreciated 
value of the investment  goods put in place would be only 22 percent  of 
its initial  installed  value-then  the net social rate of return  could be as 
low as 15  percent  per year. 
Our  conclusion  is that cross-sectional  regressions,  if they will bear a 
causal  interpretation,  suggest  net  social rates of return  from  equipment 
investment  in the range  of 20 percent  per year or more, under  the main- 
tained hypothesis that the large coefficient on equipment  investment 
arises because equipment  investment is a trigger  of learning-by-doing 
and thus of substantial  total factor productivity  growth. To the extent 
that causality flows from growth to equipment  investment, as well as 
from  investment  to growth,  the social rate  of return  would  be somewhat 
lower. To the extent that most of the productivity  gains from learning 
how to use and organize  production  with new equipment  technologies 
would occur soon after their introduction  (rather  than proportionately 
over the lifespan  of equipment),  the social rate  of return  would  be some- 
what  higher.  To be more  precise would  require  a much  sharper  vision of 
the process of productivity growth and on-the-job-training  than we 
possess. 
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Conclusions  and Implications 
This analysis suggests a strong and causal relationship between 
equipment  investment  and  economic  growth.  If our  interpretation  of the 
statistical  data is correct, a strong  case seems to exist for making  sure 
that economic policy does not penalize, and in fact rewards,  investors 
in equipment. 
One observation,  however, gives us pause. There is substantial  evi- 
dence that the centrally planned, communist-ruled  economies of the 
twentieth  century commanded  that huge fractions  of GDP be devoted 
to machinery  investment-yet  these economies have not realized  rapid 
productivity  growth.  If equipment  investment  does indeed  have massive 
external benefits, then why didn't Stalinist  Russia-which  apparently 
invested a greater  share  of total output  in machinery  from 1929  to 1973 
than  Japan  did from 1950  to 1973-even  begin  to overtake  the industrial 
West? 
We can venture an answer that attempts  to resolve the apparent  in- 
consistency between the strong cross-sectional correlation  of equip- 
ment  investment  and  growth  in market  economies and  the failure  of high 
rates of equipment  investment to trigger  rapid  productivity  growth in 
centrally planned economies. A given investment in equipment can 
yield large  external  benefits  if learning-by-doing  helps to create a work- 
force experienced  and  competent  at handling  modern  technologies, and 
helps organizations  to develop rules-of-thumb  and standard  operating 
procedures  necessary to produce  efficiently,  which other  firms  can imi- 
tate. If these are the channels  through  which  equipment  investment  pro- 
duces external  benefits,  then  it makes  sense that  few such  external  bene- 
fits would be generated  by investments in inappropriate  technologies. 
No gain accrues from creating  a workforce  trained  at technologies  that 
subtract  value. No advantage  flows  from  the opportunity  to copy the op- 
erating  procedures  of a money-losing  organization.  This leads us to sus- 
pect that the largest external benefits from equipment  investment  will 
arise  from  those investments  that  make  the highest  profits. 
Similar  reasoning  might explain why some organizations  that have 
undertaken  enormous investment  programs-such as General  Motors 
(GM)  in the 1980s-have  reaped  few productivity  gains. GM invested J. Bradford De Long  and Lawrence  H.  Summers  195 
nearly  $70 billion in the 1980s  in new plant and equipment.  Yet as best 
as can be estimated, this program  produced  only $20 billion of wealth 
for shareholders  and  bondholders.  Note that  had  GM not possessed the 
internal  cash flow to finance  this program,  it could never have financed 
it through  the capital  markets.  The high cost of external  finance  to GM 
was in large  part a judgment  by the market  about the competence and 
flexibility  of the organization-a conclusion demonstrated  by the mar- 
ket's continued  high valuation  of other firms, such as Honda, that also 
have been investing  in U.S. automobile  manufacturing  capacity. 
This line of thought  has a powerful  implication.  Economic growth  is 
likely to be increased  by policies to promote  investment  that  conform  to 
the market:  that  is, policies that  alter  the marginal  incentives  of produc- 
ers and investors and induce them to undertake  equipment  investment 
projects that had previously failed to meet hurdle rates. Policies that 
command  pre-chosen,  large-scale  investments  in equipment,  whether  or 
not they meet direct  cost-benefit  tests, are not likely to generate  invest- 
ment in the kinds of equipment  that generate high private  benefit-cost 
ratios. 
How best can rates  of equipment  investment  be enhanced?  First, the 
example of  those centrally planned communist economies that at- 
tempted  to devote enormous  resources  to equipment  investment  and  yet 
saw few productivity  gains should be heeded. That experience should 
lead governments  to avoid nonmarket  policies to boost equipment  in- 
vestment. Even if the equipment-growth  nexus is a causal one, it ap- 
pears  to be one that is potentially  swamped  by the enormous  inefficien- 
cies  that command allocation processes  generate. Incentives that 
conform  to a market  framework  appear  vastly preferable  to commands 
that  replace  such a framework. 
Second, governments  must avoid anti-equipment  incentive policies. 
Countries  where property  rights  are not respected are likely to have a 
difficult  time attracting  equipment  investment.  Countries  where macro- 
economic policies are unsustainable  and  leave the ultimate  financing  of 
current  expenditures  in doubt are also likely to see low rates of equip- 
ment  investment.  Large  budget  deficits  create  substantial  uncertainty  in 
future  tax policies and  inflation  rates;  to cut current  taxes while increas- 
ing spending  is not to reduce, but to randomize,  tax burdens.  Govern- 
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when forward-looking  firms and investors respond not by increasing, 
but by reducing,  saving and investment.  The best policy for the supply 
side is a budget  surplus  over the course of the business cycle. 
More specific policies that discriminate  against equipment  include 
"industrial  policies"  that  protect  established  firms  at the expense of new 
entrants  from home or abroad  and that force purchasers  to pay higher- 
than-world  prices for the products  of domestic capital  goods industries. 
Such  policies confuse  a high  "investment  effort"  with  a high  realized  rate 
of investment:  there is a very large  difference.  All over the world, gov- 
ernments  in the post-World  War  II era have sought  to encourage  indus- 
trialization  and growth  by providing  protection  and subsidies  for what 
they view as their high value-added  industries. In almost every case, 
governments and their supporters  have pointed to the limitations  of 
laissez-faire  theory and called for policies that wrench  resource  alloca- 
tion away from static "Ricardian"  efficiency  in the interests  of attaining 
"Schumpeterian"  efficiency.46  However, outside of East Asia, and  pos- 
sibly Brazil, such policies appear  to have been disastrous. One attrac- 
tive interpretation  is that Pacific  Rim industrial  policies have managed 
to combine subsidization  of equipment  investment and exports, while 
maintaining  a ferocious degree of domestic competition. Many indus- 
trial  policies around  the world  appear  to us to have confused  support  for 
modern  industry  with  whatever  enriches  one's current  (and  vocal)  popu- 
lation of industrialists:  this seems to us another  potential road to dis- 
aster. 
Still other  policies with an anti-equipment  bias include  tax rules that 
subsidize assets that can easily be levered. Because of transactions 
costs in second-hand  markets  and  the dedication  of equipment  to partic- 
ular  uses, pieces of equipment  are  frequently  more  difficult  to use as col- 
lateral  for debt than are investments  in structures.  On the labor  market 
side, policies that make it very costly for firms  to substitute  capital  for 
labor  are also likely to inhibit  growth  by discouraging  equipment  invest- 
ment. To the extent that workers  in the future  will gain high wages by 
virtue of their skills in handling  modern  machine technologies, rather 
than  by occupying  niches in which quasi-rents  can be captured,  it is not 
even in labor's short-run  interest  to press for a reduction  in the capital- 
labor  ratio. 
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Third,  governments  can promote  equipment  investment  in a number 
of ways. Given  that  international  capital  markets  remain  imperfectly  in- 
tegrated,  increases in national  saving-whether  induced by deficit re- 
duction  or by policies that  increase  private  saving-translate into some 
increased  equipment  investment.  Those who believe that international 
capital  markets  will not channel  substantial  long-run  flows see an extra 
35 cents of equipment  coming from each dollar of deficit reduction  or 
increased  private savings. Those who believe in open capital markets 
would  divide  that  estimate  by two or three. 
Measures  that reduce  the tax burden  on new equipment  investments 
are likely to be especially potent in maximizing  the equipment  invest- 
ment engendered  per dollar  of government  revenue forgone. While we 
have little confidence in any of the formal quantitative  estimates, we 
think  that  each dollar  of revenue  lost from  an equipment  investment  tax 
credit  would generate  an extra dollar  of equipment  investment-with  a 
larger  benefit-cost  ratio  for an incremental  investment  tax credit.47 
These policy implications  regarding  equipment  investment  have par- 
ticular  resonance  for the United States today, especially in terms of its 
performance  relative to the benchmarks  set by other industrial  econo- 
mies, such as Germany  and Japan.  That the United States, with a low 
net saving  rate  relative  to other  advanced  industrial  economies, has seen 
its national saving rate dip further  in the 1980s is well known: in the 
1980s,  the net national  saving  rate-3  percent-has  been less than  two- 
fifths  its value  in the 1960s  and 1970s.  The decline  in investment  was par- 
tially cushioned  by the large  borrowings  from abroad  of the mid-  1980s, 
but  the capital  inflow  has been substantially  reduced  in the last half  dec- 
ade. Since the mid-1980s,  largely  because of fiscal mismanagement,  in- 
vestment  in the United States as a share  of national  product  has fallen  to 
levels that  have not been seen since the Great  Depression. 
If past equipment  investment  contributes  over time to TFP growth, 
then the United States' relatively  poor past performance  may have al- 
ready hindered  the country's ability  to catch up to and match the TFP 
growth performance  of economies such as Japan. Figure 7 plots the 
equipment  capital stock per worker level in Japan and in the United 
States during  the 1980s.  The figure  shows a large  and growing  gap that 
47. They  will, however,  change  the mix of investment  toward  equipment,  which  may 
have substantial  benefits. 198  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure 7.  U.S.  and Japanese Machinery and Equipment Capital Stock per Worker, 
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has opened  in the past decade. Using our  estimates  of the strength  of the 
growth-equipment  nexus, the current  edge Japan  possesses in equip- 
ment  capital  per worker  will generate  an extra $1,200  per worker  of pro- 
ductivity  growth  in Japan  relative  to the United States in the future, in- 
dependent  of any additional  gap in future  rates  of equipment  investment 
or technological  innovation. 
There  is one final  consideration:  in even the medium  run, equipment 
is not a fixed  factor. At a depreciation  rate  of 15  percent, a given invest- 
ment has already  contributed  more than  half its capital  services to pro- 
duction  within  three  and  a quarter  years  after  installation.  At a deprecia- 
tion rate  of 12  percent, the halfway  mark  in provision  of capital  services 
occurs after  four  years. Pieces of equipment  are, therefore,  less durable 
from  the perspective  of their  permanent  contribution  to production  than 
are many employees. Equipment  has always been one of the most mo- 
bile factors  of production  in the long run. If equipment  is uniquely  valu- 
able  as a catalyst  for  learning-by-doing  and  upgrading  skills, then  in view 
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economy grow rapidly  must take extraordinary  pains to make sure that 
investors in equipment  see the economy as a hospitable  environment. 
Ample provision of infrastructure;  a skilled, trained, and motivated 
workforce;  and low taxes on new capital  investments  may well pay for 
themselves (because we live in a world where equipment  investments 
are mobile)  by virtue  of the extra  equipment  investment  they induce. Comments 
and Discussion 
Andrew B. Abel: This paper  is an important  extension of the paper  by 
Bradford  De Long and Lawrence Summers  published  in the May 1991 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  (QJE). The QJE paper documented  a 
statistically  significant  and robust cross-country  partial  correlation  be- 
tween the growth rate of GDP per worker and the equipment  invest- 
ment/GDP  ratio. The current  paper  extends the sample  in both the time 
dimension  and the cross-section dimension  and finds the same result: 
when various  factors  are held constant, a 1  percentage  point increase  in 
the equipment  investment/GDP  ratio is associated with an increase of 
about 0.20 to 0.35 percentage points in the growth rate of GDP per 
worker. Of course, allowing  for sampling  error, the range is probably 
somewhat  wider. In both investigations,  De Long and Summers  went to 
great  lengths  to make  this  finding  go away, but  the finding  survived  fairly 
intense scrutiny. It is only slightly, if at all, premature,  to say that De 
Long and  Summers  have presented  us with  a new stylized  fact. Not only 
does the new stylized  fact appear  to be a "true"  fact, but  it is an interest- 
ing fact because it is apparently  not readily explained  within the stan- 
dard  growth  theoretic  framework. 
In my comments,  I will accept the new stylized  fact as a fact and  I will 
focus on the interpretation  of the partial  correlation  uncovered by De 
Long and Summers.  The authors  argue  that  if productivity  growth  is in- 
dependent  of factor  accumulation,  then the standard  growth  accounting 
framework  can account for a coefficient of only about 0.08 in a cross- 
sectional regression  of growth  rates on equipment  investment/GDP  ra- 
tios over a 25-year  horizon. Because a typical value of the coefficient 
estimated  by De Long and Summers  is about  0.25, they argue  that  there 
is a gap of 0.17 to be explained  by externalities.  The report's  discussion 
of the role of new equipment  in providing  an opportunity  for learning- 
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by-doing  seems compelling;  at an intuitive  level, I find  this mechanism 
to be an attractive  explanation  of at least some of the growth  process. 
However, before  abandoning  the standard  growth  theoretic  framework, 
which  does not appeal  to externalities,  I need to be more  convinced  that 
the new stylized  fact is inconsistent  with the standard  framework. 
My lingering  doubt concerns the statement  that the standard  growth 
accounting  framework  predicts a coefficient  of only about 0.08 in a re- 
gression of growth rates on equipment investment/GDP  ratios. The 
value of this coefficient  is very sensitive to the timing  of changes in the 
equipment  investment/GDP  ratio over a 25-year  horizon. To illustrate 
this sensitivity, consider the following simple model. Output  in year t, 
Y(t),  is produced  according  to the Cobb-Douglas  production  function 
(1)  Y(t) =  KE(t)t  Ks(t)  L(t)I --, 
where  KE(t)  is the stock of equipment  at the beginning  of year t, KS(t) is 
the stock of structures  at the beginning  of year t, and  L(t) is the amount 
of effective units labor in year t. Along the initial steady-state  growth 
path, there is no embodied  technical  progress  for equipment  or struc- 
tures. The effective units of labor grow according to L(t) = (1 + n)(1 + g) 
L(t -  1), where n is the population  growth rate and g is the growth of 
effective units of labor per worker. Let iE(t)  be the equipment  invest- 
ment/output  ratio  and  let is(t) be the structures  investment/output  ratio. 
In the initial  steady state, with both types of capital  growing  at the rate 
(n + g), the capital equipment/output ratio is  iE'[(l  + n)(1 + g) -  (1 -  dE)], 
where dE is the depreciation  rate of equipment.  The capital structures/ 
output  ratio  is  isl[(I  +  n)(1  +  g)  -  (1  -  ds)],  where  ds  is  the 
depreciation  rate of structures. 
Now consider  starting  from  the initial  steady state and  increasing  the 
average  equipment  investment/output  ratio by 1 percentage  point over 
a 25-year  horizon.  Based on an earlier  draft  of the report,  set iE equal  to 
0.075, is equal  to 0.100, dE  equal  to 0.17, and  ds equal  to 0.02. In addition, 
set n equal  to 0.01 and  g equal  to 0.02 so that  (n + g) equals  0.03. Finally, 
set a equal  to 0.10 and 3  equal  to 0.15. With  these parameter  values, the 
net marginal  product of equipment  is 9.7 percent, which is about the 
same as the 9.5 percent  net marginal  product  of structures. 
Now consider  a permanent  increase in iE(t)  to a value of 0.085. As a 
result  of this increase  in equipment  investment,  the average  growth  rate 
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which yields a coefficient  of output  growth  on iE of 0.063-close  to the 
value of 0.08 found by De Long and Summers  using different  (implied) 
values of a and P. 
But what would the regression  coefficient  be if instead  of jumping  to 
0.085, iE rose linearly  over a 25-year  horizon  and the average  over this 
horizon  was 0.085? In this case, the coefficient  increases to 0.092. The 
later during  the 25-year horizon that the increase in iE(t)  occurs, the 
larger  will be the regression  coefficient  of growth  on iE. For instance, if 
iE(t)  remains  0.075 for 15  years and then increases  to 0.100  for 10  years, 
the average  value of iE will rise by 1 percentage  point to 0.085, but the 
regression  coefficient  would be 0.119. If the increase in iE(t)  is concen- 
trated  in the last five years of the horizon, the regression  coefficient  in- 
creases to 0.161. 
Is the timing  of iE(t)  that  yields a regression  coefficient  of 0.161  realis- 
tic? I do not honestly know, but I would not be shocked to learn that 
the countries  with high average  values of iE from 1960  to 1985  were the 
countries  that took advantage  of the computer  revolution  and substan- 
tially  increased  their  equipment  investment  in the 1980s. 
The calculations  presented  above were calculated  under  the assump- 
tion-imposed  by De Long and Summers when computing  standard 
growth  theoretic  predictions  of the regression  coefficient-that produc- 
tivity growth  is independent  of factor  accumulation.  But why did differ- 
ent countries  invest different  shares  of GDP  in equipment?  De Long and 
Summers  use data  on the relative  price  of equipment  to argue-convinc- 
ingly, in my opinion-that  high rates of equipment  investment were 
driven  by rightward  shifts  of the supply  curve  for  equipment,  rather  than 
by rightward  shifts of the demand  curve for equipment.  As they point 
out, a predominance  of supply shifts would account for the observed 
negative  cross-sectional  correlation  between  equipment  investment  and 
the relative  price of equipment. 
One possible source of rightward  shifts of the equipment supply 
curve is technical  progress  in equipment,  which reduces  the price of an 
effective unit  of equipment.  Put  differently,  those countries  in which  the 
level of technology embodied in equipment  grew rapidly  and was ex- 
pected to grow rapidly  would  be attractive  environments  for equipment 
investment.  If a high rate of equipment  investment  resulted  from rapid 
technological progress embodied in  equipment, then the  standard 
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faster accumulation  of equipment  and to the growth  in the productivity 
of equipment. 
This channel  can be added  to the model  used above simply  by assum- 
ing  that  in each year  of the 25-year  horizon,  equipment  benefits  from  fac- 
tor-augmenting  technical progress at the rate of 0 per year. But what 
value of 0 might  accompany  a 1  percentage  point increase  in iE? We can 
get an estimate  (that  is likely to be somewhat  high)  using  the TFP regres- 
sions reported  by De Long and Summers  in table 11. Before  using these 
regressions  for this purpose,  I would  like to comment  on the interpreta- 
tion  of TFP  in the context of the Cobb-Douglas  production  function  used 
by De Long and Summers. 
Consider  the following  production  function: 
(2)  Y(t) =  A(t)  F[4E(t)KE(t),  S(t)KS(t),  L(t)L(t)], 
where  A(t) is total factor productivity;  and the 4s represent  factor aug- 
menting  technical change in equipment,  structures,  and labor (human 
capital). Each year,  Y(t), KE(t), KS(t), and L(t) can be observed,  but in 
general, the values of A(t),  E(t),  4s(t),  and  L(t)  cannot be observed  or 
inferred.  Some additional  identifying  restriction  is needed to measure 
total factor productivity  A(t). For instance, if the productivity  of each 
factor grows at a constant rate, so that i(t  +  1)A*i(t)  =  1 +  Oi,  i = E,S,L, 
then it may be possible, in principle,  to estimate Oi,  i = E,S,L, and to 
calculate  A(t) for all t given a specification  of the production  function. 
The specification  used by De Long and  Summers  to estimate  total  fac- 
tor productivity  is, unfortunately,  underidentified.  For a Cobb-Douglas 
production  function,  the separate  productivity  parameters  that are spe- 
cific to each factor are simply not identified.  Under the Cobb-Douglas 
specification,  equation  2 becomes 
(3)  Y(t) =  A(t)4E(t)o4fS(t)'3L(t)'  -  '-KE(t)OKs(t)'L(t)I  -  '3- 
Although  it is simple  to calculate  the growth  rate of Y(t)  =  A(t)0E(t)P 
S(t)0P*L(t)1'-  from  data  on output,  equipment,  structures,  and labor, 
it is impossible  to disentangle  separate  growth  rates of A(t),  E(t),  S(t), 
and  L(t),  even under the assumption  that three of these four produc- 
tivity variables  grow at constant  rates. De Long and Summers  calculate 
the growth rate of A(t) by assuming that  L(t)  is a simple parametric func- 
tion of years of schooling  per worker  (which is observable),  and by as- 
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Summers  parameterization  of  L(t)  is accepted, then the values they ob- 
tain for the growth  rate of A(t) are actually  equal to the growth  rate of 
A(t)4E(t)bIS(t)'. If the identifying  assumption  is made  that  A(t) and 4s(t) 
are  both constant  over time, then the values that  De Long and Summers 
compute  for the growth  rate  A(t) are actually  the growth  rate of 4E(t)O. 
An earlier  version of table 11  reported  TFP regressions  for various  val- 
ues of a and P.  used in computing  TFP. Interpolation  of those results  in- 
dicated  that  for the case in which a  = 0.1 and 1P  = 0.15, the coefficient 
on the equipment  investment/GDP  ratio  would  be 0.125. If instead  of the 
total  factor  productivity  A(t), this result  applies  to  E(t)0,  this result  im- 
plies that  equipment-augmenting  technical  progress  is increased  by 1.25 
percent  per year when  iE is increased  by 0.01. 
Now, based on the previous paragraph,  suppose that an increase of 
1.25 percent per year in equipment-augmenting  technical progress in- 
duces a 0.01 increase  in the average  value  of iE(t)  over a 25-year  horizon. 
If iE increases  immediately  by 0.01 and  remains  at its new level over the 
entire  25-year  horizon,  the regression  coefficient  of output  growth  on iE 
would be 0.187, which is very close to the coefficient of 0.198 that De 
Long and Summers  estimate  in the sample  of high-productivity  econo- 
mies they used to estimate the TFP growth regressions. Essentially 
nothing  is left to be explained  by externalities.  If instead  of a permanent 
0.01 increase  in iE(t),  iE(t)  rises linearly  over a 25-year  horizon,  the esti- 
mated coefficient increases to 0.217. If the increase in iE(t)  is concen- 
trated  in the last ten years  of the 25-year  horizon,  the coefficient  is 0.246. 
If the increase  in  iE(t)  is concentrated  in the last five years  of the horizon, 
the coefficient  is 0.289. 
The calculations  in the previous  paragraph  probably  overstate  the co- 
efficient  of output  growth  on iE because they attribute  all of the growth 
in  A(t)*E(t)OiPS(t)  to growth  in  E(t),  leaving no room  for growth  in A(t) 
or 4s(t).  My guess is that assuming  zero growth in the productivity  of 
structures  is probably  not a bad  assumption.  I do not have a feel for how 
much of the growth  in A(t)PE(t)x  should  be attributed  to growth  in total 
factor  productivity  and how much should  be attributed  to growth  in the 
productivity  of equipment.  Furthermore,  the essence of the identifica- 
tion  problem  is that  for the Cobb-Douglas  specification,  we will never  be 
able to disentangle  these two potential  sources of growth. 
To summarize,  the De Long  and  Summers  report  has  produced  an  im- 
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vestment  and output  growth. My discussion has not focused on the va- 
lidity  of this  fact because  this report  and  the QJE  paper  together  virtually 
convince me that  it is true. I also find  attractive  the explanations  of this 
stylized  fact that  involve externalities  and  learning-by-doing.  But my re- 
luctance to completely embrace  these explanations  is perhaps  best ex- 
pressed in the language  of hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis is 
some version of standard  growth  theory without externalities,  and the 
alternative  hypothesis is that externalities  are important  in the growth 
process. In my discussion, I have attempted  to show that the stylized 
fact is not inconsistent  with the null hypothesis, which means that it is 
premature  to reject  the null  hypothesis  of no externalities.  As in any hy- 
pothesis testing, failure  to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as 
accepting the null hypothesis. De Long and Summers  have offered a 
credible  alternative  hypothesis;  future  work may actually  lead to a con- 
vincing  rejection  of the null hypothesis  in favor of their  alternative.  But 
for now, there does not seem to be enough  evidence to throw  away the 
null  hypothesis. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Gordon  questioned  the paper's  implication  that  an investment 
tax credit  for equipment  would  be preferable  to greater  funding  of educa- 
tion or public infrastructure.  He pointed out that, since the 1930s, the 
ratio of equipment to structures in the United States has increased 
sharply, with a significant  decline in the average productivity  of U.S. 
equipment,  suggesting  a decline in its marginal  productivity  as well. He 
reported  calculations  of marginal  factor productivity  growth  using dif- 
ferent  assumptions  about  capital. Attributing  the entire share  of capital 
to equipment,  he found zero marginal  productivity  growth for equip- 
ment since 1964.  With  various other assumptions,  productivity  growth 
has slowed in recent years. Gordon  questioned  whether  the cross-sec- 
tional  findings  in the paper  could  be reconciled  with  this U.S. time-series 
experience. 
Echoing  Bill Clinton's  campaign  slogan,  Summers  responded  that  he, 
too, believed in "putting  people first." Investments in human capital 
and good infrastructure  are not only desirable in their own right, but 
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the contradiction  between U.S.  time-series evidence and the cross- 
sectional evidence in the paper, but argued that the cross-sectional 
evidence was the more persuasive. He suggested as a corollary  of the 
report's  results  that  the welfare  loss caused by distortions  in the cost of 
capital  through  investment  tax incentives is very small, relative  to their 
effects on growth. 
Most panel members  accepted the paper's new "stylized fact" that 
equipment investment had a higher-than-expected  effect on output 
growth.  However, Mancur  Olson questioned  whether  the association  is 
causal. He suggested  that higher  equipment  investment  may simply be 
associated with other growth-inducing  factors. Because all countries 
have the same  access to equipment  at similar  prices  (excluding  transport 
costs), differences  in economic performance  cannot be fully explained 
by equipment investment alone. There must be a reason why some 
countries invest in more or less equipment  than others, and whatever 
those reasons are, they themselves may be the reasons for differences 
in growth. He noted, for example, that Argentina,  with terrible  general 
economic policy, had low growth and, perhaps only incidentally,  had 
low investment  in equipment.  In the same vein, Robert  Hall suggested 
that  policies that encouraged  investment  in equipment  are often part  of 
a package of standard  free-market  economic policies. Equipment  in- 
vestment is therefore  a proxy for the pro-trade  and  pro-growth  policies 
that  in fact are responsible  for high  growth. 
Summers  defended  the claim that the equipment  variable  is not sim- 
ply a proxy for other policies. First, he noted that instrumenting  for 
changes  in equipment  investment  with  a variable  that  is not strongly  cor- 
related  with other policies-changes  in the saving rate-does  not alter 
the results. Second, the effect of equipment  remained  when the authors 
included  other  variables  that  attempt  to directly  capture  the broad  policy 
regime, such as the World  Bank index of openness. Third,  if the extent 
of liberalization  were driving  the results, then, when both quantity  and 
price  in the regressions  are included,  it would  be expected that  the price 
variable  would be significant.  This relationship  would be predicted  be- 
cause equipment  prices reflect tariff  barriers  and other internal  distor- 
tions. In fact, only the quantity  variable  remains  significant  in this form 
of regression. 
William  Nordhaus  was not convinced  that  the instruments  used were 
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genuinely  exogenous variables  such as the investment  tax credit  or the 
depreciation  allowance, which changed  frequently  in countries  such as 
the United Kingdom. Summers  replied  that he and De Long were not 
convinced that looking at year-to-year  variations  in such instruments 
would be a way of testing for externalities.  In addition,  the investment 
incentives are not fully exogenous because governments  often intro- 
duce them when investment is low. He reported  that he and De Long 
searched unsuccessfully for sufficient data on effective tax rates on 
equipment. 
Christopher  Sims  pointed  out that  the policy implications  of the paper 
would  be different  if one did not accept its conclusion  that  the observed 
statistical  association  of equipment  investment  share  with growth  must 
reflect an externality. He did not doubt the statistical  association, but 
saw three  main  reasons  to be skeptical  of its representing  an externality. 
First, the paper's theoretical calculations  that show weak associa- 
tions of equipment  investment  share  with growth  rates in a model with- 
out externalities are undertaken  as though variations in investment 
share  were sustained  over the 15-to-40  year  periods  considered.  The re- 
gression  results  apply  to growth  rates over historical 15-year  periods in 
which shares of investment were not constant within each country. 
Even the very long-run  panel, although  it uses data  from a long span of 
time, uses 15-year  averages  as data  points. If there  were any substantial 
fluctuation  in investment  shares  over time within  these 15-year  periods, 
the relevant  T  in table 10  might  well be closer to 5 or 7 than  to 15. 
Second, embodiment  effects (which make productivity  on newly in- 
stalled  equipment  higher  than  on old equipment  and  may cause obsolete 
equipment  to be retired  before it has physically decayed) would make 
intermediate-run  elasticities  of productivity  with  respect  to gross invest- 
ment substantially  higher  than long-run  elasticities-and  by more than 
would  be implied  by table 10, without  this implying  any externality. 
Finally, the paper's arguments  for a structural  interpretation  for its 
regression  have weaknesses. If there were little room for substitution 
between equipment  and other factors, so that technology required  a 
nearly  fixed ratio  of output  to equipment  stock, then the bivariate  rela- 
tionship  of investment  share  to output  growth  rate would  be nearly  pro- 
portional.  To capture  correctly  from  data  the fact that  investment  share 
increases nonetheless have small effects (if other factors are held con- 
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other  factors  in the regression  specification.  To the extent that  we do not 
have data  on these factors, they would enter the error  term, and the as- 
sumed  lack of substitutability  would imply  that they are strongly  corre- 
lated  with the equipment  investment  share  regressor.  The paper  uses in- 
struments  that are plausibly  correlated  with equipment  investment  but 
not with, say, an exogenous disturbance  to the level of technical  knowl- 
edge. But if the disturbances  in these regressions  come from  omitted  fac- 
tors of production  that, because of the technology,  must  respond  almost 
automatically  to increases in output and equipment, the instruments 
used in the paper  will do little to reduce  the simultaneity  bias. 
If the vintage  model of equipment  is correct, Sims reasoned  that cal- 
culations of social return  on equipment  for periods of time like those 
used in the paper  would be greatly  affected. He carried  his argument  to 
the cases of Argentina  and  Japan  discussed  in the paper:  Argentine  poli- 
cies toward equipment  may indeed have kept output below the tech- 
nological frontier, and hence retarded  growth. By contrast, Japanese 
investment  policies may have led to wastefully  high  obsolescence rates, 
stimulating  productivity at too high a cost in forgone consumption. 
Joseph  Stiglitz  agreed  that  it would  be desirable  to take  into account  vin- 
tage effects, but noted that equipment  is short-lived  in practice. There- 
fore, although  a model assuming  embodiment  may give an initial  spurt 
in growth, he doubted  that it would be significant  over the time period 
considered  in the report. 
Summers  acknowledged  the need for more work on the issue of em- 
bodiment  and  the need to distinguish  between  the social  return  on equip- 
ment  investment  and  external  returns  associated  with  equipment.  How- 
ever, he believed that the increase in output  associated with equipment 
investment  over a 25-year  period  cannot  be explained  without  externali- 
ties, unless private  returns  are on the order  of 20 to 25 percent  per year. 
Others  questioned  whether  learning-by-doing  is the source of the ex- 
ternality  as suggested by the paper. Nordhaus  remarked  that the case 
of the Swedish Horndal  plant, which had inspired  the Arrow model of 
learning-by-doing,  does not fit the externality  story  because the produc- 
tivity increase  seemed unrelated  to investment.  He agreed  that  the rates 
of return  on different  kinds  of investment  may be unequal,  citing  the ex- 
ample  .of  energy  conservation  projects  in California,  where there is evi- 
dence of extremely high private and social rates of return. Stiglitz of- 
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large social returns. He suggested that equipment  investment may be 
closely associated  with the use of nontraded  intermediate  goods, whose 
production  involves high fixed costs. Hence greater  equipment  invest- 
ment stimulates demand  for intermediate  goods, which have a lower 
cost when produced  in larger  volumes. This induced  scale economy can 
be thought  of as a positive externality  of the equipment  investment. 
Julio  Rotemberg  called attention  to the use of OECD shares  of labor 
and capital  in the production  function. The share of capital  is typically 
much higher  in developing  countries  than in the OECD, leading  to the 
association of high growth rates and high capital shares in standard 
models. He noted that the current model would indicate high TFP 
growth  for Singapore,  although  other  studies  have found  no TFP growth 
at all. The latter result is caused by Singapore's  output growth being 
lower than expected from its very high investment  rate. This prompted 
Gordon  to suggest adding  Singapore  to the two "S's" described  in the 
paper-Josef  Stalin and former General Motors chairman Roger 
Smith-as  cases in which rapid  growth  in equipment  investment  did not 
lead to correspondingly  rapid  output  growth.  Stiglitz  remarked  that cal- 
culations of TFP in countries such as Singapore  are problematic:  not 
only are factor  prices noncompetitive  because of government  controls, 
but  state-owned  firms,  which  are  major  investors, do not necessarily  op- 
timize  in the neoclassical  sense. As a result,  the production  function  co- 
efficients  assumed  for such countries  may be meaningless. 
Martin  Weitzman  questioned  the application  of the conventional  de- 
mand-and-supply  apparatus  to the equipment  market  and  was therefore 
skeptical  that the observed  price-quantity  correlations  could be used to 
establish the direction  of causation. Weitzman  argued  that the market 
structure  for equipment  is either  oligopolistic  or monopolistically  com- 
petitive; thus high quantities  may be associated with low prices, not 
necessarily with high prices, as the perfectly competitive model pre- 
dicts. Gregory  Mankiw  added  that the equipment  prices used in the pa- 
per might simply reflect the relative price of traded versus nontraded 
goods. In this case, rapid  economic growth  would lead to higher  prices 
of nontraded  goods, resulting  in the lower  price  ratio  observed. Thus  the 
association  of lower relative  prices  and  higher  quantities  does not neces- 
sarily  establish  the supply-side  causation  that  the report  argues. 210  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
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